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Editor
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Responsible for publication:

Almas Arzikulov

Layout:

Yelena Tushkova

Translation by IE Dyusseminova

Address:

Kazakhstan Institute
for Strategic Studies under the President
of the Republic of Kazakhstan
4, Beybitshilik St.
Astana, 010000, Republic of Kazakhstan

Phone: (7172) 75 20 20

Fax: (7172) 75 20 21

E-mail: office@kisi.kz

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF KAZAKHSTAN'S PEACEKEEPING CAPABILITIES AS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR FOR STRENGTHENING NATIONAL SECURITY

Georgy Dubovtsev

Chief Researcher, Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies
under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan,
Candidate of Military Sciences, Associate Professor

Abstract. The article considers the content and current trends of peacekeeping activities which in modern conditions become one of the most important components for strengthening the international security, one of the main tools of the world community for early detection and timely prevention of the emerging military-political crises and the military conflicts by political means. Since modern peacemaking represents a complex and many-sided problem in which political and military actions are closely interconnected, the article analyses the legislative framework regulating peacekeeping operations, reveals international legal and military problems reducing efficiency of international efforts on peacekeeping. The article also analyses participation of the Kazakhstan contingent in peacekeeping operations and offers recommendations about activation of our country's participation in peacekeeping process of the UN and other international organizations.

Key words: *International and national security, military conflicts, military actions, peacekeeping activity, peacekeeping operations, peacekeeping contingent.*

ҚАЗАҚСТАННЫҢ БІТІМГЕРШІЛІК ӘЛЕУЕТІН АРТТЫРУ ҰЛТТЫҚ
ҚАУІПСІЗДІКТІ НЫҒАЙТУДЫҢ МАҢЫЗДЫ ФАКТОРЫ

Георгий Дубовцев

Аңдатпа. Мақалада халықаралық қауіпсіздікті нығайтудың маңызды құрамдас бөліктерінің бірі, жаңа қозып келе жатқан әскери-саяси дағдарыстар мен әскери шиеленістіктердің алдын алу мен оны саяси әдіс-құралдар арқылы уақтылы тоқтатуға арналған әлемдік қауымдастықтың негізгі құралдарының бірі саналатын бітімгершілік қызметтің мазмұны мен заманауи үдерістері қарастырылған. Заманауи бітімгершілік саяси және әскери шаралар өзара тығыз байланысқан күрделі және көпқырлы мәселе болғандықтан, мақалада бітімгершілік шараларды жүзеге асыруды реттейтін нормативтік-құқықтық базаға талдау жасалынып, бейбітшілікті сақтаудағы халықаралық әрекеттердің нәтижесін төмендетіп отырған халықаралық-құқықтық және әскери мәселелер анықталған. Сонымен қатар, қазақстандық қосынның бітімгершілік шараларға қатысу тәжірибесі сараланған және БҰҰ мен басқа да халықаралық ұйымдардың бітімгершілік үдерістеріне отанымыздың қатысуын барынша белсендендіру бойынша ұсыныстар жасалынған.

Түйінді сөздер: *халықаралық және ұлттық қауіпсіздік, қарулы қатығыстар, әскери шаралар, бітімгершілік қызмет, бітімгершілік операциялар, бітімгершілік күштер, бейбітшілікті сақтау бойынша шаралар.*

РАЗВИТИЕ МИРОТВОРЧЕСКОГО ПОТЕНЦИАЛА КАЗАХСТАНА КАК ВАЖНЫЙ ФАКТОР УКРЕПЛЕНИЯ НАЦИОНАЛЬНОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ

Георгий Дубовцев

Аннотация. В статье рассматриваются содержание и современные тенденции миротворческой деятельности, которая в существующих условиях становится одной из важнейших составляющих укрепления международной безопасности, одним из основных инструментов мирового сообщества для раннего обнаружения и своевременного предотвращения политическими средствами назревающих военно-политических кризисов и военных конфликтов. Поскольку современное миротворчество представляет собой сложную и многогранную проблему, в которой тесно взаимосвязаны политические и военные акции, в статье дан анализ нормативно-правовой базы, регламентирующей проведение миротворческих операций, выявлены международно-правовые и военные проблемы, снижающие эффективность международных усилий по поддержанию мира. Проанализирован также опыт участия казахстанского контингента в миротворческих операциях и предлагаются рекомендации по активизации участия нашей страны в миротворческом процессе ООН и других международных организаций.

Ключевые слова: *международная и национальная безопасность, вооруженные конфликты, военные действия, миротворческая деятельность, миротворческие операции, миротворческий контингент, операции по поддержанию мира.*

Introduction

In modern conditions intensity in a number of regions of the world promptly increases. The probability of the development of crisis situations into open armed conflicts in Africa, in the

Middle East, in the former Soviet Union became higher. Prolonged and difficult to settle military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Ukraine are an eloquent testimony of the escalation of unpredictable on the consequences and difficultly controlled armed conflicts.

Characteristic feature of the modern military conflicts is shift from the interstate plane into the plane internal state one. As a rule, the ethnic and interfaith antagonism, separatism aggravated by the crisis phenomena in all areas of public life becomes a reason for them. These conflicts are often followed by violations of the human rights and crimes against humanity, death of the civilian population, and destruction of key objects of physical infrastructure.

For this reason the world community, first of all, on behalf of the UN makes considerable efforts for the prevention, localization and termination of such conflicts. The interests of the international security require intervention of the UN member countries in such conflicts by carrying out peacekeeping operations.

The Republic of Kazakhstan considers peacekeeping activities as the most important component of the policy on strengthening collective and national security, considers it one of the main instruments of early detection and timely prevention emerging military-political crises and the military conflicts by political means ("About approval of the Military doctrine of the Republic of Kazakhstan" Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, March 21, 2007 N 299. URL: <http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/U000000334> [access: 1.08.2016]).

The purpose of peacekeeping activities is the termination of armed conflict and creation of the conditions promoting its political settlement.

The military doctrine of the Republic of Kazakhstan determines accomplishment of the international liabilities on peacekeeping and security, including participation in peacekeeping activities within accomplishment of relevant decisions (resolutions) of the UN Security Council among the main objectives of our state's defensive policy ("About approval of the Military doctrine of the Republic of Kazakhstan" Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, October 11, 2011 N 161. URL: <http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/U1100000161> [access: 1.08.2016]).

Therefore the subject of the article is actual both with theoretical and practical points of view.

Research methods

The theoretical and methodical basis of research includes system, comparative, problematical and other general scientific approaches, and also a wide range of methods in modern military science, political science and some other interdisciplinary sciences.

The research applies the interdisciplinary approach based on the general methodological approaches accepted in the military science, political science, diplomacy, the international relations and the theory of security revealing the existing methods and the analysis of the international conflicts.

The research of the declared subject demanded application of various research methods: the system analysis, logical (the analysis, synthesis, induction, deduction, analogy, generalization) methods, and also the methods of establishing causes and effect relationships of the researched processes, methods of formalization and idealization, operations research and other general scientific methods.

It promoted the complex assessment of content, concepts and conclusions stated in documents of the UN, other international organizations, and also in regulations of Kazakhstan and other countries in which fundamental provisions on peacekeeping activities are formulated.

Use of system and complex approaches to studying of content and current trends of peacekeeping activities, to the analysis of the legislative framework regulating carrying out peacekeeping operations allowed revealing a number of the international legal and military problems reducing efficiency of international efforts on peacekeeping.

Besides, special methods of military science, military forecasting, generalization of experience of carrying out operations; analysis of experience of peacekeeping doctrines were used for the analysis of gained experience of peacekeeping activities, identification of the available allowances and opportunities for activation of the Kazakhstan contingent's participation in peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the UN and other international organizations.

The logic of a formulation of conclusions and recommendations proceeded from the principles of deduction, they are made on the basis of the analysis and generalization of the available documents and historic facts.

1. Content and modern trends of peacekeeping activity

Since the second half of the XX century peacekeeping process has begun to play a special role in the international relations as peacekeeping activities directly influence the world reorganization in interests of ensuring the collective and international security. In the new century the peacemaking role even more increased. It is connected with new nature of the conflicts. Only the few of modern crises have nature of the interstate conflicts for which mechanisms of collective security of the UN and the regional unions were created. They are succeeded by civil wars, internal interethnic and interfaith armed conflicts. The violence thus arising does not keep within the commonly accepted war regulations, it uses all means, including the most sophisticated and barbarous, leads to numerous loss of life. Therefore in modern conditions, the problems of prevention and settlement of armed conflicts during which the civilian population generally perishes and suffers, act into the forefront in policy of many states and international organizations.

The term "peacekeeping" in that sense in which it is used in the UN, means application of diplomatic means with the purpose to convince the party participating in the conflict to stop military operations and during negotiations to settle the dispute by peaceful manner.

Meanwhile, in attempt to give not ordinary, but scientifically exact and politically accurate interpretation of peacekeeping, the lack of its conventional determination is being revealed.

The analysis of the UN and other international organizations documents, and also national regulations of various countries shows that in general *the collective actions of the international organizations (the UN, OSCE, the CIS,*

etc.) of political, economic, military and other nature which are carried out according to regulations and the principles of international law for the purpose of solving of international disputes, prevention and the termination of armed conflicts mainly by peace methods are usually considered as peacekeeping activities [1].

Kazakhstan legislation also provides definition of peacekeeping activities. So, the law "About Peacekeeping Activities of the Republic of Kazakhstan" which was adopted on June 15, 2015 states that *in relation to such activities of our state, it is set of the measures including the means and methods corresponding to purpose and tasks of the UN Charter, with implementation of the military and (or) civil personnel directed on prevention, control and the termination of armed conflicts between the states or within the state by means of intervention of the third party and promoting peacekeeping and security, humanitarian assistance according to the international liabilities accepted by the Republic of Kazakhstan* (The law of the Republic of Kazakhstan of June 15, 2015 No. 320-V "About peacekeeping activities of the Republic of Kazakhstan". URL: http://online.zakon.kz/Document/doc_id=39843849 [access: 1.08.2016]).

Thanks to purposeful activity of the UN, the international practice under generalized concept of peacekeeping activities has implemented such innovations as peace support operations, humanitarian operations, missions for supervision and establishment of the facts of aggression, post-conflict peace-building and others [2].

Peacekeeping is performed by different methods and means which change together with development of a geopolitical situation in the world and a condition of society conflict environment in various countries.

From the moment of expansion of the UN first peacekeeping mission in 1948 over 120 countries voluntary made available about 800 thousand military personnel and police officers to the UN. Together with thousands of civil specialists they took part in 68 peace support operations.

Within the last ten years on average 15 peacekeeping operations with participation of thousands of the military personnel, police officers and civil specialists from the different states are performed annually. The period of 2008, when the UN took part in settlement of 17 conflicts was the most intense. The budget of peacekeeping activities at that time constituted about 4 billion dollars.

Now the UN carries out 16 peacekeeping missions, 9 of them on the African continent. The largest of them are:

1) *The United Nations mission on stabilization in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO)* where the number of the military and police personnel from **55 countries** constitutes **19 784 people**, the international civil personnel - 840 people, the local civil staff - 2725 people and volunteers of the UN – 450 people;

2) *The mixed operation of the African union and the UN in Darfur (UNAMID)* in Sudan where the number of the military and police personnel from **46 countries** constitutes **17 754 people**, the international civil personnel - 845 people, the local civil staff - 2565 people and volunteers of the UN – 169 people;

3) *United Nations mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)* where the number of the military and police personnel from **60 countries** constitutes **12 523 people**, the international civil personnel – 769 people, the local civil staff - 1204 people, volunteers of the UN – 409 people;

4) *Multi-profile complex United Nations mission on stabilization in Mali (MINUSMA)* with a number of the military and police personnel from **48 countries - 10 207 people**; the international civil personnel – 578 people, the local civil staff - 682 people, volunteers of the UN – 124 people;

5) *Multi-profile complex United Nations mission on stabilization in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)* where the number of the military and police personnel from **47 countries** constitutes **10 806 people**, the international civil personnel – 462 people, the local civil staff – 219 people and volunteers of the UN – the 76th persons.

6) *Peacekeeping mission of UNIFIL - Temporary forces of the UN in Lebanon* has considerable scales with military personnel from **36 countries** constituting **10 410 people**, the international civil personnel – 279 people, the local civil staff – the 590th persons. (The UN peacekeeping operations. URL: <http://www.un.org/ru/peacekeeping/operations/current.shtml> [access: 26.07.2017]).

The UN peacekeeping activity is based on the principles of joint execution of burden and distribution of risks, and, eventually, it manages much cheaper than unilateral measures. The countries of the European Union, for example, finance up to 40% of all expenses connected with peacekeeping activities, but there are only 10% of Europeans in peacekeeping forces. The USA finance more than 25% of all expenses on peacekeeping activities, but only lightly more than 80 American citizens participate in 8 peacekeeping operations.

The greatest number of citizens is sent to structure of the peacekeeping contingents by Bangladesh (9 432 people), Ethiopia (8 309 people), India (7 794 people) and Pakistan (7 533 people) (the UN peacekeeping operations. URL: <http://www.un.org/ru/peacekeeping/operations/current.shtml> [access: 26.07.2017]).

For a long time developing countries provide the greatest number of the military personnel and police officers for peace support operations, their share nearly two thirds of the UN peacekeepers.

During the considered period the scales of peacekeeping operations have sharply increased, the number of the personnel participating in them has significantly risen. And, if earlier peacekeeping forces carried out only control and dividing functions, now they are attracted for the purpose of peacemaking (enforce the peace by force methods).

Thus, from initial understanding of peacemaking as activities for non-admission of violence in relation to anybody there is a considerable transformation of its content.

Actions of military nature, namely, the UN peacekeeping operations are performed in two forms:

1) *the UN military observers' missions* for observing a truce and cessation of hostilities;

2) *sending the UN armed forces recruited from various countries ("blue helmets") into the "hot spots"*. A role of these armed forces is absolutely different, than in case of implementation of the UN forced actions. They do not conduct military operations against belligerent parties, armed with light weapons and use it only for self-defense. The troops watch the termination of military operations, as well as military observers of the UN, and also are used for separation of warring parties, creation of buffer zones between them and other similar tasks.

Analysis shows that there has been no single, strictly verified and approved terminology describing peacekeeping operations until now.

Specifics of various types of peacekeeping operations allow three large blocks to be distinguished:

The first – *using mainly not force methods of actions* armed forces (supervision, various forms of control) for a reinforcement of political and diplomatic efforts on the termination and settlement of the conflict;

The second - *a combination of political methods with active operations of the armed peacekeeping contingents*, however, not conducting military operations;

The third – using force methods, including military operations to enforce the peace in combination with political efforts or without them.

The UN peacekeeping operations essentially were originally based on three interconnected principles:

- 1) agreement of both conflicting parties;
- 2) neutrality;
- 3) minimum use of force, generally – for the self-defense purpose.

In recent years during the major peacekeeping operations all these three principles underwent to a new interpretation. There is an essential expansion of the appropriate authority which is often beyond traditional peacekeeping actions and followed by auxiliary structures in the form of the military contingents and military equipment provided to the UN forces.

The UN continues to remain a principal body on prevention and settlement of armed conflicts. However, in recent years, there is even more clear tendency of displacement of efforts on security provision from global to regional level. The UN, along with own activities on conflict resolution, even more often attracts the regional organizations, including OSCE and NATO, for peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping operations of multinational forces in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and on the African continent are a striking example of it.

Such expansion of a framework affected structure of participants in peacekeeping process, in recent years, a process of redistribution of roles in peacemaking between the UN and regional security structures appeared as a result. This tendency has objective character and reflects realities of the modern world.

Actually in case of implementation of peacekeeping functions by the UN and other international organizations one more qualitatively new tendency which consists in washing out of distinctions between actually peacekeeping actions and enforcement measures is created. It is closely connected with a tendency to downgrade a role of the required agreement of warring parties as to the prerequisite of the organization and carrying out peacekeeping operation. Some operations of the UN are performed according to Chapter VII of the UN Charter that does not necessarily need agreement of warring parties. Sometimes enforcement measures, including military ones, are undertaken not by the Security Council, but one of the regional military-political organizations. Such intervention took place in three serious crises in the last years (the North of Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, Somalia) and was followed by change of approaches to carrying out peacekeeping operations.

Besides, the purposes of some operations are beyond mediation or supervision, and may include creation of conditions for safe delivery of the humanitarian assistance or protection of certain areas against military actions. In all similar cases the traditional principles of the minimum use of force and self-defense do not always work.

Recently, a number of tendencies appeared in approaches of the international organizations (the UN, OSCE, NATO) to peacekeeping operations which generally consist in recognition by the international community of the right and an obligation to assume responsibility for providing with all means, including force, the peace, law and order, and safety of citizens in those states in which for any reasons these fundamental living conditions can't be provided by national means.

So, now in the UN practice it is considered normal to attract armed forces at any stages of the conflict, including without coordination with conflicting parties (though under the mandate of the international organizations) for accomplishment of preventive, mediation, humanitarian and other functions in the conflict region.

The military contingents of the UN, contrary to the criteria occurring earlier, in a number of peacekeeping operations (in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia) used not only light, but also heavy weapon, armored machinery and aircraft.

If earlier the mandate of the UN recommended limiting use of force by self-defense, formulations including "preventive defense", "prosecution" and "replacement" of the resisting groups, preventive placement of armed forces and "preventive demonstration of force" now start practicing in the international armed conflicts.

Certainly, regional and subregional structures shall have some freedom of action in response to crisis situations, however, it shall occur in case of indispensable accounting of provisions of chapter VIII of the UN Charter, respect of the predominating role of the UN Security Council in the international security.

In general, the analysis of experience of carrying out peacekeeping operations within the last decade allowed the main tendencies of modern peacekeeping process to be revealed.

The first. Transition from intervention mainly in interstate conflicts (specific to 1940-1970ss) to a broader and frequent intervention in the internal conflicts.

The second. Expansion of the scales of intervention, quantity of operations going in parallel, as well as the size of the countries presented in operations and the involved contingents.

The third. There is a shift of accents to operations on enforcement to the peace.

The fourth. There is a delegation of power on settlement of regional crises from the UN to the regional military-political organizations, and in some cases - even to the certain states. The number of operations performed by the regional organizations, as independently, so and in cooperation or at the request of the UN, has increased. Often the initiative and responsibility not only for a military stage of operations, but also for political settlement, passes from the UN to other international organizations and the coalitions of the states.

The fifth. Peacekeeping operations become more and more complex and multicomponent.

The sixth. Enhance the transfer of military operations planning and command and their stages to a military management of the certain countries and groups of the states.

The seventh. Strict demarcation between peacekeeping operations and peace-making operations (enforcement to the peace) is blurred. Elements of forced actions in structure of operations have increased, use of heavy weapons and military equipment, use of force by the peacekeeping contingents not only for self-defense, but also for more frequent demonstration of force, precautionary expansion, force separation of the parties, disarmament of illegal armed groups.

The eighth. There is a frequent gap between the military and political party of operations, delegation of political and diplomatic functions to the militaries. Tasks of a military stage of operation are usually carried out quicker and more successfully, than tasks of political conciliation and post-conflict restoration of peace, however the armed peacekeeping forces staying in a zone of the conflict is being prolonged for ensuring stabilization of a situation.

The ninth. An erosion in criteria of "impartiality" and "equidistance" of peacekeepers

from the parties of the conflict, recognition of possible attraction of the countries having own interests in the conflict region to the operations. The practice of 1960-80ss on an exclusion of the military contingents of the countries - permanent members of the UN Security Council from the structure of participants in operations, transition to active participation of "great powers" in peacekeeping operations has been refused.

The tenth. Complication and more frequent audit of operation mandates. Precautionary intervention in emerging conflicts is more earlier audit. Transition from prevalence of "classical" observation operations to more and more resolute force implementation on conflicting parties.

The eleventh. Peacemaking acts as the catalyst of state cooperation development in military area.

The twelfth. Peacemaking reflecting new approaches to application of armed forces starts making impact on transformation of military doctrines provisions for the purpose of refining the tasks of national armed forces, including their participation in carrying out peacekeeping operations.

2. International law and military problems of conducting peacekeeping operations

The main purpose of the UN formulated in its Charter is maintenance of international peace and security. Achievement of this purpose is the main objective of the UN and all its bodies. Peacekeeping operations are only one of the means for achieving the main goal of the UN. At the same time a feature of this mean is that it is not provided by the Charter or any other legally binding act of the UN. **The first international legal problem** consists in it.

Practice of carrying out peacekeeping operations shows that the experience which had been summed up during their carrying out has not been realized in regulations of an international document.

The report of the former UN Secretary-General Boutros Ghali (1992-1996) "An

Agenda for Peace" offered rather difficult gradation of the UN operations including preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, post conflictual peace-building, disarmament, sanctions and enforcement measures [3]. Borders between these terms are blurred, and some of the modern operations have so multicomponent character that may include elements of several or even all listed above types of operations. The relevance of a conceptual framework sharply increased after the organizations, for example, NATO and the CIS began to perform own regional operations. Thus, so far there is no clear understanding and interpretation of peacekeeping operations in international law.

The resolutions of the UN Security Council are the legal basis for each operation authorizing its carrying out and determining its mandate. Such resolutions, certainly, bear some legal basis, but they are the administrative acts having a certain target value and time limits on action. It is impossible to deny value of other documents of the UN, in particular, materials of the Security council where experience of carrying out peacekeeping operations is generalized, ideas on their enhancement and development are pushed. However, in legal sense such documents at best can be regarded as the materials which are helping to understand an essence of peacekeeping operations, but not determining their legal status, the rights and obligations of the parties involved in their implementation one way or another.

The second problem is that multicomponent and multipurpose nature of modern peacekeeping operations makes their tough fixing in this or that chapter or article of the UN Charter unreal and inexpedient. Modern peacekeeping operations can consist of military, police and civil components, can carry out functions on peacekeeping, enforcement to the peace or restoration of peace.

For this reason many specialists put a question of development of the UN Convention concretizing the Charter provisions in relation to peacekeeping operations. It is about

development of the framework document establishing, first of all, a conceptual framework, as well as the general and operational principles of carrying out peacekeeping operations, bases of the status of their participants.

The third problem is that many countries have their legislative norms on participation in peacekeeping operations which not always correspond to the international ones. In this regard inevitable difficulties accomplishing the Security Council resolutions appear due to distinction of the international and national legal bases.

In a situation when the mandate on force measures for peacekeeping does not require agreement of the government or the governments involved in the conflict, Chapter VII of the UN Charter speaks about the mixed operations. The mixed operations are called sometimes the third generation of peacekeeping operations, this term was applied in Bosnia in due time. Often vague legal boundaries between peacekeeping operations and operations with force implementation undermine the trust to the UN and threaten life of its personnel. Therefore, the Security Council in each separate case has the right to make the decision on correctness of operations on peace enforcement, allocating the appropriate human and material resources for their implementation.

The fourth problem as was showed by experiment of carrying out peacekeeping operation in Somalia, consists in not always effective coordination of efforts of peacekeeping forces. Various states, as a rule, were more often aiming to ensure safety of the national contingents, than were thinking of collateral actions coordination. But it is dangerous as well to provide a freedom of action to national commands because it can lead to sharp increase in losses of the UN military contingent.

The fifth problem has purely military character. It is connected with compatibility of systems of managing the national contingents within multinational forces, distinctions in the level and requirements to preparation of staff, armament and military equipment, operational and tactical standard rates.

The sixth problem is in lack of common system of the international monitoring over a military-political situation in crisis points that results in inability to prevent unleashing of the local conflicts timely, makes preventive measures of the states of the world community ineffective.

The seventh problem is the miscalculations in political settlement allowed by participants of peacekeeping process which lead to a gap between accomplishment of military part of peace agreements and implementation of political, social, economic and administrative processes. It causes constant prolongation of the mandate of peacekeeping forces, involves unjustified human losses and considerably increases expenses of financial resources on carrying out operations.

3. Experience and possible forms of Kazakhstan's participation in peacekeeping operations

Nature, conditions and forms of participation of Kazakhstan in peacekeeping operations are determined by international legal regulations, the legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the international liabilities, agreements and agreements which our country is participant of.

The law "About Peacekeeping Activities of the Republic of Kazakhstan" of June 15, 2015 determines the tasks of our country's peacekeeping activities:

- 1) prevention of disagreements between the parties, non-admission of development of the conflicts into armed conflicts, restriction on the scale of a conflict;
- 2) assistance to the termination of violent acts by diplomatic means and methods;
- 3) participation of military personnel in collateral international forced actions according to the UN Charter;
- 4) protection of the territory and (or) the population in a zone (area) of carrying out peacekeeping operations from armed attack;
- 5) ensuring compliance with conditions of ceasefire;

6) separation of conflicting parties, disarmament and disbandment of divisions;

7) assistance to the problem resolution of the refugees and persons who are temporarily moved within the country;

8) humanitarian assistance;

9) recovery of infrastructure in a zone (area) of carrying out peacekeeping operations;

10) providing law and order, safety of the population and observance of human rights;

11) other tasks provided by the mandate [4].

The increased role of the international peacemaking as means of armed conflicts resolution was confirmed by military doctrines of the Republic of Kazakhstan adopted in 2000, 2007 and 2011 where peacekeeping operations are considered as one of forms of the Armed Forces, other troops and military forming application. Thus, the military doctrine puts participation of military forming in peacekeeping operations in one row with their appliance for ensuring military security of the state.

The Armed Forces, other troops and military forming of Kazakhstan participation in a peacekeeping activity, in addition to the law stated above and the military doctrine, is regulated by the international treaties ratified by our country, a number of signed documents, including the Concept of forming and functioning of the mechanism of peacekeeping organization activity of the Agreement on collective security (2004), the Agreement on peacekeeping activities of the CSTO; Regulations on Collective peacekeeping forces of the CSTO (Official site of the CSTO of URL: <http://www.dkb.gov.ru/d/bzzi.htm> [access: 26.07.2016]).

Implementation of the tasks in operations on maintenance and restoration of the peace is assigned to the divisions of the Armed Forces, other troops and military forming of the Republic of Kazakhstan which are specially prepared according to international standards.

Their participation in peacekeeping operations is performed based on the decision of Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan made

according to the Constitution, the legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the ratified international treaties.

Staffing of the allocated contingent is carried out on a voluntary basis.

The allocated contingent during peacekeeping operations can carry out the following tasks:

1) blocking of the area of the conflict for the purpose of ensuring accomplishment of the sanctions accepted by the international community;

2) separation of armed groups of conflicting parties and their disarmament;

3) providing ceasefire and peace-making regime, prevention of renewal of military operations;

4) mine clearing of the district, liquidation of fortification constructions and consequences of weapons of mass destruction usage;

5) control of transportations, suppression of illegal import and export of military equipment, weapon, ammunition and explosives;

6) control over the district and actions of the population in a separation zone, counteraction to conflicts;

7) assistance to regional authorities (law enforcement agencies) in law enforcement, safety of the persons which came back to places of former accommodation;

8) protection and maintenance of the humanitarian assistance freight;

9) providing safety of formal meetings for negotiations on settlement of the conflict and safety of the personnel of peacekeeping missions.

The first peacekeeping mission of the Kazakhstan military contingent is participation in stabilization of a situation in the Republic of Tajikistan as a part of Collective peacekeeping forces of the CIS from 1993 to 2001. Operation in Tajikistan has a status of full-fledged regional peacekeeping operation of the CIS. It was performed based on the collective decision of heads of states of the CIS (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), had the mandate of the CIS [5]. Common military leadership was performed at this operation

through the international body - Headquarters on coordination of military cooperation of the State Parties of the CIS. Thus, observer mission of the UN was in parallel developed in Tajikistan.

According to the decision of the heads of states of the CIS, the Kazakhstan's separate composite rifle battalion took part in joint protection of the Tajik-Afghan border. In its structure there were two companies of frontier guards, two motorized infantry companies from Armed Forces and one company from Internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan. It is known that actions of Collective peacekeeping forces of the CIS promoted the end of the conflict in Tajikistan and brought the peace to this country.

In the second half of 1990ss the joint peacekeeping battalion - "Tsentrzbat" was created by the decision of the heads of three states: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. The divisions which are a part of this battalion were deployed in the territory of the countries. But life showed that this battalion could function successfully only during peacekeeping trainings. The first such training "Tsentrzbat-97" was conducted in September, 1997 in the territory of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the last one – in 2000. Because of insufficient study of the legislative framework regulating "Tsentrzbat" functioning and its comprehensive providing, further this joint peacekeeping division was defunct.

In pursuance of the directions of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N. A. Nazarbayev about ensuring readiness of the Armed Forces for actions in peacekeeping operations and according to his order of January 31, 2000 "About creation of the Kazakhstan peacekeeping battalion" the special peacekeeping division "Kazbat" which was a part of reserve forces of the UN was created.

Now there is already a separate brigade – "Kazbrig" as a part of airmobile troops for accomplishment of peacekeeping tasks.

Since 2003 international tactical and special peacekeeping training "Steppe Eagle" have

began to be staged annually at first based on "Kazbat", and then on "Kazbrig". Originally they were carried out as the Kazakhstan-British joint training. The USA military personnel have participated since 2005, therefore the trainings have gained a tripartite format. Since 2012, the trainings are staged within the "Partnership for Peace" program with participation of the military personnel of the USA, Great Britain, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Germany, Lithuania, France, Italy and other states. This purpose is included in the individual action plan of partnership of Kazakhstan with NATO. In 2015 representatives of headquarters of NATO, soldiers and officers of the USA participated in these trainings, along with Great Britain, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and also for the first time - Afghanistan, Nepal and Turkey.

Peacekeeping tasks as a part of multinational stabilization forces in Iraq were carried out by the Kazakhstan engineer group from 2003 to 2008. This group was a part of a multinational division "Center South" under the Polish management, and since fall of 2007 he was subordinated to the American command of a multinational division "Center".

Within 5 years there were 9 rotations in the group in which 290 servicemen of the Kazakhstan army participated as a part of coalition forces. The main objectives of the contingent were search and destruction of unexploded ammunition, the equipment of points of field water supply, water purification and delivery of health care.

The Kazakhstan peacekeepers in Iraq destroyed more than 4 million explosive subjects. Since 2005, within experience exchange, instructors of armed forces of Kazakhstan have trained 572 cadets of military academy of Iraq on disposal. The Kazakhstan medical officers constantly were attracted for work in medical group of the American Delta base where they provided medical care to more than 5000 people - to representatives of the coalition and local population, generally to the victim of terrorist attacks (In Kazakhstan the public Union of veterans of Iraq is created.

URL: http://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=31078450 12 [access: 27.07.2016]).

Accomplishment of peacekeeping tasks by the Kazakhstan military contingent in Iraq was highly appreciated by the world community, a management of the UN, and also heads of a number of the states including Iraq substantially promoted strengthening of authority of our country on the international scene. Also valuable experience of participation of the Kazakhstan military personnel in accomplishment of tasks was got by the multinational coalition.

It serves as confirmation of urgent active participation of the Kazakhstan contingent in peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the UN and other international organizations which are carried out based on the issued legal mandate.

In addition to strengthening of the international authority of the country, vigorous peacekeeping activity is of great importance for promotion of military-political positions and interests of Kazakhstan in the international affairs, and also ensuring its national security.

Officers of the Armed Forces of Kazakhstan **currently** serve only in two peacekeeping United Nations missions in Western Sahara (MINURSO) and Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI). Though there is a significant amount of the military personnel in the Kazakhstan army who had special training and capable at the high level to carry out tasks as military observers in the United Nations missions.

From Tsentrazbat's experience of the 1990s, and also missions in Iraq some valuable lessons were learned for the organization of special peacekeeping training by the Kazakhstan military personnel. In particular, it was revealed, what practical difficulties arise at the peacekeeping contingent in operational compatibility with the international military forming. Taking it into account, the infrastructure necessary for preparation of the national contingent and also its language preparation was considerably enhanced.

Techniques and standards of NATO are widely used during preparation of the Kazakhstan peacekeeping divisions for the

purpose of ensuring operational compatibility with multinational peacekeeping forces.

Within implementation of the cooperation plan between Kazakhstan and NATO in July, 2008 based on Military institute of Land forces the "Partnership for Peace" training center ("Kazcent") was created. A main objective of the center is training of the military personnel of Kazakhstan, the countries of NATO and partners for participation in peacekeeping operations. In December, 2010 "Kazcent" is acknowledged by NATO as the educational center within the "Partnership for Peace" program.

According to the practice which has developed in recent years, during peacekeeping operations participation of the Kazakhstan military contingents in forced actions for settlement of the conflicts is not excluded. However, participation in operations on the peace enforcement is an extreme lever on a crisis situation therefore the direction of the Kazakhstan peacekeeping contingent for accomplishment of tasks in such operations shall be performed only in the presence of the respective mandate of the UN Security Council, in strict accordance with the UN Charter and the current legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan by which the corresponding procedure of a parliamentary approbation of such decision is provided.

The tasks carried out by the military contingents of the Armed Forces, other troops and military forming of the Republic of Kazakhstan allocated for participation in peacekeeping operations under single command, shall be implemented by the following principles:

- recognition of the UN domination in maintenance of international peace and safety;
- observance of the UN Charter, international legislation, laws of the host state;
- agreement of all parties participating in settlement;
- impartiality;
- the common leadership and control by the UN Security Council;
- respect of human rights, customs and traditions of local population;

- use of force, as a rule, for the purpose of self-defense and for a suppression of the forced attempts to prevent accomplishment of the mandate of peacekeeping forces (the minimum sufficiency, selectivity, harmony, prevention of collateral damage).

It is obvious that fundamental criteria, by which it is necessary to be guided in case of the direction by Kazakhstan of the peacekeeping contingents in "hot spots", shall be:

firstly, foreign policy feasibility of participation of the national contingent in peacekeeping operations;

secondly, compliance to national interests as in general on the international scene, so within this region;

thirdly, expansion of peacekeeping forces only after preliminary signing of the relevant agreement by the international body and conflicting parties or obtaining from the latter accurate guarantees that they agree with peacekeeping forces in a zone of the conflict of and do not intend to counteract them;

fourthly, availability of resources adequate to the operation's mandate and readiness of the UN Security Council or other international organization to provide the corresponding financing;

fifthly, the minimum acceptable risk for the Kazakhstan peacekeeping contingent in peacekeeping operation. Expansion of this contingent shall happen, as a rule, after stabilization of a situation and in the presence of a political will to the conflict resolution by political methods at the parties.

The opinion stated above on possible forms of Kazakhstan's participation in peacekeeping operations relies, first of all, on experience and practice of the United Nations peacekeeping operation. At the same time they consider the experience of carrying out operations by collective peacekeeping forces, as well as those changes which peacemaking has undergone for the last 20 years designating transition to the operations including, in addition to the "traditional" tasks, a package of measures directed on the solution of the problems which were generated by the conflict:

prevention of humanitarian disasters, suppression of cases of mass human rights violations, assistance to implementation of democratic transformations.

Conclusion

The first conclusion which can be made as a result of the conducted research is that settlement of the modern conflicts, peace establishment and peacekeeping need the wide arsenal of flexible structures and mechanisms which, first of all, shall be based on economic, social, political and diplomatic efforts. The peace cannot be established completely if not to eliminate the cause of conflict. However, the increased danger of an emergence of the crisis situations and armed conflicts has faced international community to a difficult problem of a choice whether to agree with violence or to interfere to prevent it.

Therefore modern peacemaking represents a complex and many-sided problem in which political and military actions are closely interconnected. The choice of optimum option of actions is a difficult and responsible task.

In difficult dialectics of peaceful and military means of peacekeeping activities some positions have special value.

Firstly, the interrelation between preventive diplomacy and use of military force is extremely difficult and has no exact determination. In practice all types of the UN activities on peacekeeping (preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, enforcement to peace, peace-building) inevitably intertwine with each other. Some of them are performed in parallel with actions of other security organizations.

Secondly, there is a basic distinction between peacekeeping and forced actions. The question of reasonable and accurate criteria of the situation when in interests of peacemaking military efforts are justified and necessary is absolutely ambiguous. In that case when the military contingents during peacekeeping operations start killing people, they become participants of the conflict which they are supposed to control.

Thirdly, peacekeeping is used to give diplomats opportunity for work. Peacekeeping operations,

in particular, expansion of multinational peacekeeping forces in intensity zones, are directed on preventing the beginning or renewal of military operations, and also to put local flashes of the possible conflict under control. They can be also considered as the most important component of comprehensive process in peaceful settlement.

Fourthly, military enforcement is only one and last resort by means of which it is possible to achieve only limited results and which cannot be considered a universal remedy. For peace-making it is necessary to direct efforts first of all on liquidation of the origins of the conflicts: economic ailments, social injustice, political dictatorship. Nevertheless, in some cases use of force can appear the only way to put an end to genocide; to help creation of the conditions necessary for conflict settlement; to stabilize a situation for carrying out humanitarian operations.

Fifthly, in peacekeeping operations it is not about conducting classical military operations against regular forces of the opponent for the purpose of their destruction, and about suppression of a will of the opponent to actions, about his neutralization, about protection of the population, that is about peacekeeping actions.

The second conclusion which is formulated from the results, - in case of implementation of peacekeeping activities Kazakhstan needs to adhere to a principled stand about necessity of collective efforts consolidation according to decisions of the UN Security Council and the universally recognized norms of international law for ensuring the regional and international security.

In this regard Kazakhstan faces a task to increase a role of the UN Security Council, strengthen control over carrying out peacekeeping operations. Coordinated actions with the states sharing this position, and also providing representation of our country in the structures of United Nations secretariat, first of all, in Department on peacekeeping operations (DPKO) are necessary for achievement of this purpose.

The third conclusion: for further enhancement of peacekeeping process it is reasonable for Kazakhstan to advance the following initiatives:

1) strengthening of the United Nations secretariat structures dealing with problems of peacekeeping and military questions;

2) close interrelation of peacekeeping operations with tasks on assistance to political process and peaceful dispute resolution;

3) expansion of structure of the UN reserve forces provided by the State Parties for implementation of peacekeeping operations;

4) accurate definiteness of the mandate, duration and conditions for the termination of operation;

5) availability of adequate resources and financing;

6) inclusion of the questions relating to carrying out peacekeeping operations; enhancement of the standardized procedures for the purpose of interaction of forces of various states into the national programs of preparation of military and civil personnel;

7) the composition of the joint command structure of peacekeeping forces shall reflect adequately the number and a role of the national contingents participating in this peacekeeping operations;

8) possibility of control from a national and military management.

Fourth conclusion. In response to the UN Secretary General's address who has called to assume specific liabilities on providing new system of readiness for the UN peacekeeping operations during the Summit on peacemaking within the anniversary - the 70th session of the United Nations General Assembly of the world leaders, our country could considerably intensify the participation in peacekeeping activities.

Firstly, to allocate the national military contingent in structure of the created forces of fast reaction of the UN, and also skilled police officers and experts in the field of justice for participation in peacekeeping missions.

Secondly, to initiate a question of the Kazakhstan peacekeeping contingent participation in such operations as United Nations mission on stabilization in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), United Nations mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS),

Multi-profile complex United Nations mission on stabilization in Mali (MINUSMA), Multi-profile complex mission of the United Nations on stabilization in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), and also in peacekeeping mission of UNIFIL (the UN interim forces in Lebanon).

It is obvious that, along with foreign policy feasibility of the Kazakhstan contingent participation in each of these peacekeeping operations, one of the major factors is also finance costs. In the operations stated above the expenses are compensated by the UN. Therefore our country needs to aim at participation in them.

The fifth conclusion. Conditions of the national contingent participation in peacekeeping operations and a task order shall be performed according to special arrangements between the international organization establishing peacekeeping operations, force headquarters and Kazakhstan's party which shall exercise political control and military command of the Kazakhstan military contingent.

The sixth conclusion. In case of the Kazakhstan military forming participation in peacekeeping operations they shall be well prepared not for conducting classical military operations against regular forces of the opponent for the purpose of their destruction, and for suppression of a will of the party applying the armed violence to its neutralization, but for protection of civilians.

Military department of Kazakhstan to which the tasks on development of rules and plans of

preparation for peacekeeping operations and the organization of their execution are assigned by the current legislation needs to consider it.

The seventh conclusion. A number of peacekeeping operations currently has only civil and sometimes a police component, as well as components of the humanitarian assistance and post-conflict reconstruction. Some operations actually are a complex of actions for retraining of police officers, employees of boundary protection and other security service, in some cases - on providing safe conditions of carrying out political elections, recovery of political institutes and economic infrastructure.

In this regard activation of peacekeeping activities in Kazakhstan shall not be limited to preparation of military personnel in Armed Forces, other troops and military forming. It is necessary to involve other state bodies of the Republic of Kazakhstan in these activities which at the high professional level are capable to resolve issues of rendering a humanitarian, medical and technical assistance, training of the corresponding specialists.

Our country as an active member of the UN for the objective reasons is interested in activation of the international peacekeeping activities as peacemaking promotes military-political stability in the world. Therefore, further development of peacekeeping capacity in our country is an important factor of a national security strengthening.

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MAIN STAGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN

Arsen Turgambayev

Master's degree in International Relations,
Consultant to Protocol and International Relations Service at the
Central Office of “Nur Otan” Party.

Abstract. Since independence, Kazakhstan has pursued mutually beneficial relations with all countries, especially neighbouring ones, based on the principles of good-neighbourliness, mutual respect and non-interference in internal affairs. All those principles eventually have become generating ones in building a multi-vectoral foreign policy of Kazakhstan.

The report analysed basic documents which are the primary in the foreign policy of modern Kazakhstan and include N.A.Nazarbayev's article “Strategy of the development of Kazakhstan as sovereign and independent state”, Foreign Policy Concept of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 1995 and 2001, as well as Foreign Policy Concept of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 2014-2020. An official course and peculiarities of the state's foreign policy vector of each stage, the most important accents, similarities and differences have been identified on the basis of these documents.

Key words: *The Republic of Kazakhstan, foreign policy, main stages, evolution, multi-vectoral policy.*

ҚАЗАҚСТАН РЕСПУБЛИКАСЫ СЫРТҚЫ САЯСАТЫНЫҢ НЕГІЗГІ ҚАЛЫПТАСУ КЕЗЕҢДЕРІ

Арсен Тұрғамбаев

Аңдатпа. Қазақстан егемендігін алған кезден бастап барлық мемлекеттермен, әсіресе, көршілес елдермен достық, өзара сыйластық пен мемлекеттің ішкі істеріне араласпау принциптеріне негізделген өзара тиімді қарым-қатынас орнатуға тырысты. Осы принциптердің барлығы, сайып келгенде, Қазақстанның көпвекторлы саясат жүргізуіне қозғаушы күш болды. Жұмыста қазіргі Қазақстанның сыртқы саясатын жүргізу барысына негіз болған құжаттар талданған. Оларға Н.Ә. Назарбаевтың «Қазақстанның егеменді және тәуелсіз мемлекет ретінде қалыптасу және даму стратегиясы», 1995 және 2001

жж. арналған Қазақстан Республикасы сыртқы саясатының Тұжырымдамасы және Қазақстан Республикасы сыртқы саясатының 2014–2020 жж. арналған Тұжырымдамасы жатады. Осы құжаттардың негізінде әр кезеңдегі мемлекеттің ресми бағыттары мен сыртқы саяси веторы, негізгі алғышарттары, сонымен қатар олардың ұқсастықтары мен айырмашылықтары анықталған.

Түйінді сөздер: *Қазақстан Республикасы, сыртқы саясат, негізгі кезеңдер, даму, көпвекторлылық.*

ОСНОВНЫЕ ЭТАПЫ СТАНОВЛЕНИЯ ВНЕШНЕЙ ПОЛИТИКИ РЕСПУБЛИКИ КАЗАХСТАН

Арсен Тургамбаев

Аннотация. С момента обретения независимости Казахстан пытался построить со всеми странами, особенно со странами-соседями, взаимовыгодные отношения на принципах добрососедства, взаимоуважения и невмешательства во внутренние дела. Все эти принципы в итоге стали генерирующей при построении многовекторной внешней политики Казахстана.

В работе проанализированы базовые документы, которые являются основными при реализации внешней политики современного Казахстана. К ним можно отнести статью Н.А. Назарбаева «Стратегия становления и развития Казахстана как суверенного и независимого государства», Концепцию внешней политики Республики Казахстан 1995 и 2001 гг., а также Концепцию внешней политики Республики Казахстан на 2014–2020 гг. На основе этих документов выявлены официальный курс и особенности внешнеполитического вектора государства каждого этапа, наиболее важные акценты, а также их сходжесь и различия.

Ключевые слова: *Республика Казахстан, внешняя политика, основные этапы, эволюция, многовекторность.*

The largest geopolitical tectonic shift of the XX century which entailed a parade of the independent states has set a complex challenge for a management of Kazakhstan: to create and practically realize the foreign policy of the new state. Despite 550-year history of the Kazakh statehood, modern Kazakhstan had another chance to build a new state with its domestic and foreign policy from the ground up. The state began to undertake measures for establishing dialogue with the world community, considering at the same time current international transformations and new challenges.

Creation of the concept of foreign policy

by Kazakhstan was predetermined by not only awareness of its importance on the world scene, but also identification of accurate priorities of the foreign policy.

Foreign policy achievements of modern Kazakhstan are the result of the viable and rational concept of the foreign policy promoting cooperation with Russia, China, the countries of Central Asia, the European Union, the USA and others.

Relying on official documents, until now, the foreign policy history of independent Kazakhstan has been divided into 4 stages, and each of these stages have conceptual vision of the foreign policy which is known as guide to implementation of short-term and mid-term plans and protection the state's interests. Thus, various concepts of foreign policy since the moment of independence

have determined a role and a place of the republic in the system of international relations, along with the "vision of the state on perspective tasks of foreign policy in the conditions of the growing globalization"

At the next stage of Kazakhstan's foreign policy creation, the Head of state has determined a number of priorities of the foreign policy program which were arranged in the form of the Concept of the foreign policy, creating representation about places and roles of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the world scene, strategic priorities, the purposes, foreign policy's tasks and methods of their achievement

The article "Strategy of Formation and Development of Kazakhstan as Sovereign and Independent State" by N. A. Nazarbayev published on May 16, 1992, proclaims conceptual approaches to the foreign political strategy of the Republic of Kazakhstan. This article, in fact, is the first attempt to reflection on own way of development in difficult conditions.

This article has a fundamental character as it determines an ideological basis - a self-determination of the nation. As an integral component of the state, adhering to the basic principles of the international relations of the UN Charter, the Republic of Kazakhstan has strengthened its position on the world scene by implementation of above-mentioned purposes. It is also rather important that the President declared intention to realize only peace-loving foreign policy, to establish and enhance equal and mutually beneficial relations with the states, showing interest in a cooperation with Kazakhstan.

On the economy, the strategy proclaimed two basic economic principles. First, creation of socially oriented competitive economy on market conditions. Secondly, development of special legal frameworks to implement the principle of economic self-determination of the citizen. The

Republic of Kazakhstan officially declared the privatization program and reducing state properties to the level of 30-40% in the future. An application of indirect methods of economic regulation in budget and tax, monetary and social policies was supposed in the sphere of economy within implementation of the formulated purposes

Today this document is objectively considered the first three-year plan of the state development, first of all, relying on the strong presidential power. The first state institutes of the Republic of Kazakhstan were created along with the first strategy: ministries, armed forces and intelligence agencies, customs and diplomatic services. There were taken some steps for strengthening of frontier with the neighbouring countries.

The Concept of foreign policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 1995 approved by the decree of the President became the second stage of Kazakhstan's foreign policy creation. This document has declared, for the first time, the importance of multivector policy aimed at respect of long-term national interests. The central geographical location of the country in the region was estimated as the bridge between the West and the East. This moment has received the reflection in the concept according to which the Republic of Kazakhstan has defined development of friendship with the Russian Federation, fruitful relationship with the People's Republic of China and with other neighbours.

Public authorities, including the MFA of the Republic of Kazakhstan, faced the task of the fastest completion of delimitation process. It should be noted that the Concept of 1995 once declared the West priority within a foreign policy cooperation of Kazakhstan. One of the reasons for that was Kazakhstan's accession to the Partnership for Peace program on May 27, 1994 for strengthening the dialogue and military cooperation with NATO

* Tokayev T.K., Strategiya Respubliki Kazakhstan v otnoshenii zapada (natsionalnye interesy, priority, napravleniya). Dissertation. Moscow, 2009 p. 23

** Idrissov Y.A., Kontury kazakhstanskoi diplomatii do 2020 goda. Kontseptsiya vneshnei politiki RK na 2014-2020 gg. i zadachi po ee realizatsii. Materialy kruglogo stola (April 11 2014). Almaty 2014. p. 108

*** N.Nazarbayev, Kazakhstanskii put'. Karaganda, 2006 p.11.

**** Daniyarova A.E., «Vzaimodeistvie Kazakhstana i organizatsii Severoatlanticheskogo dogovora (NATO)», Respublika Kazakhstan v sisteme mirovoi politiki. / Edited by academician of NAS RK A.M.Gazaliyev. Karaganda: published by KarGTU 2011. p. 30.

Since the first days of independence Kazakhstan tried to realize exclusively peace-loving foreign policy which result was a refusal of inherited nuclear missile arsenal the fourth in size in the world. The second Concept also proclaimed the idea of reducing weapons of mass destruction. It is necessary to recognize that this idea brought the greatest dividends to Kazakhstan both political, and image ones.

The Concept of foreign policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan approved by the Security council of the Republic of Kazakhstan on March 15, 2001 became *the third* stage of Kazakhstan's foreign policy formation. As well as in the previous concepts, it paid special attention to the principle of multi-vector nature. The term "multi-vector nature" "is derivative of pragmatism and realism, of the aspiration to observe balance between desires and opportunities of Kazakhstan on the international scene"*****.

The approach based on multi-vector nature quite often caused and to this day causes ambiguous reaction among some politicians and political scientists, but the alternative is barely found. The foreign policy of Kazakhstan remains multivector and diversified, but this multi-vector nature has begun to get a principle of different weights*****. Besides, a specific place in the concept is held by a question of Kazakhstan's participation in the international organizations, including CICA, which initiator was Kazakhstan. The important place is also taken by the place of the West — relationship with the EU and the USA.

Despite big adaptedness of the Concept of foreign policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 2001 to realities of that time, it was after all introduced some certain changes. External threats in the form of the events on September 11, crisis in Iraq and Afghanistan, distribution of terrorism and some other threats forced to

rethink a situation in the world completely. In this regard, in 2005, under N. Nazarbayev's decree some amendments were introduced in the Concept of 2001. This time Kazakhstan faced a new problem requiring the solution: protection of Kazakhstan's interests on the world scene as the new regional leader. Foreign policy strategy began to follow the rule "first economy, then policy". Priorities were accurately placed: the Russian Federation, People's Republic of China, the USA, the EU, Central Asia and Islamic world.

The Concept of foreign policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2014-2020 of January 21, 2014 relying on foreign policy outlined in Strategy Kazakhstan-2050 became *the fourth* stage of the foreign policy. There was a fundamental difference of this concept from all previous ones: new modernizations, "the increased international role and influence of Kazakhstan, emergence of essentially new trends in modern world politics and economy"*****.

Strategy Kazakhstan-2050 is guided by a long-term outlook till 2050. This document designates long-term strategic objective — inclusion of Kazakhstan in thirty of the most developed countries of the world.

Strategy was developed in the conditions of, on the one hand, preserving succession of Kazakhstan's foreign policy and, on another, demonstrations of objectivity of this strategy in the conditions of world instability*****.

An opportunity to give an adequate assessment to Kazakhstan's potential, its interests in the sphere of geopolitics, economy, in the military sphere is currently of first-priority, as only taking into account such assessment it was possible to determine the country's position on the world scene as the large regional state, which is interested in creating a zone of neighbourliness and mutual safety, respect of integrity of the territory and sovereignty.

***** Gubaidullina M.Sh., Printsipy i vybor vneshnepoliticheskikh prioritetov Respubliki Kazakhstan v kontseptualno znachimyykh dokumentakh. Vestnik KazNU, 2009.

***** Kontseptsia vneshnei politiki trebuyet adaptatsii k sovremennym usloviyam // Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, February 21 2001; in addition, Kontseptsia vneshnei politiki. March 15 2001 // Kazakhstan today. March 16 2001

***** Idrisov Y.A., Kontury kazakhstanskoi diplomatii do 2020 goda. Kontseptsia vneshnei politiki RK na 2014-2020 gg. i zadachi po ee realizatsii. Materialy kruglogo stola (April 11 2014). Almaty 2014. p. 108.

***** Ibid.

Destruction of bipolar system of the world functioning and emergence of the signs of multipolarity, all of this "resulted in necessity of carrying out foreign policy which would answer realities of the modern world and would correspond to national-state interests of Kazakhstan"*****.

Its publicity became a distinctive feature of the new concept. It has been made for the solution of two tasks at once; first, to designate clear and concrete reference points for activity of Kazakhstan's diplomacy, secondly, "to help our public and foreign partners to understand a course and important aspects of Kazakhstan's foreign policy better"*****. Openness corresponds to spirit and the principles of creation of information policy within the republic where the emphasis is placed on informing on the directions of implementation of foreign and domestic policy, social and economic development. Such openness has also applied value as it excludes any opportunity for speculation*****.

Laconism is another feature of the concept. Accurately stated theses "as though represent the foreign policy philosophy of Kazakhstan calculated for the next seven years"*****.

Features of Kazakhstan's geographical arrangement provide it both certain geopolitical benefits and difficulties, if estimate it from the point of view of geoeconomy. The arrangement of Kazakhstan between two centers of force — from the North — Russia, from the East — China, serves as a factor for vigilance, but also gives it additional opportunities for implementation of the flexible, balanced policy which will be directed for achievement of its long-term interests. On the other hand, Kazakhstan is the biggest country in the world without direct exits to the World Ocean that is communication vulnerability. All this serves as an additional

incentive for activization and diversification of Kazakhstan's foreign policy activities.

In the conditions of quickly changing political and economic relations, the priorities in the concept are placed as follows:

1. promotion of state interests on especially pragmatic principles, the sequence and balance;
2. responsibility for regional security in Central Asia, assistance to elimination of prerequisites for conflict situations in the region;
3. support of international initiatives on strengthening of security measures in the world;
4. consolidation of a cooperation with various countries and organizations for strengthening of defensive control mechanisms and national defense capability;
5. strengthening of friendship and cooperation with Russia, China, Central Asia, the USA, the EU countries, Asia Pacific region;
6. gradual transition of the state to a "green" way of development and entry into number of thirty developed countries of the world;
7. preserving national and cultural originality, support to the Kazakh diaspora and Kazakh language abroad*****.

As soon as the concept of Kazakhstan's foreign policy for 2014-2020 is created based on the Address of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan "The Kazakhstan way — 2050: the single purpose, single interests, the single future", especial attention is paid to positive external conditions for the productive realization of the development strategy, strengthening of a multinational community, ensuring high welfare of the people, guarantee of the civil laws, creation of the constitutional and democratic state. If earlier emphasis was placed mainly on protection of the state's interests, today the center of gravity would consistently displace on ensuring requirements of society that is very im-

***** Tokayev K.K., Pod styagom nezavisimosti. Ocherki o vneshnei politike Kazakhstana. Almaty. Bilim, 1997 p. 14-15.

***** Idrisov Y.A., Kontury kazakhstanskoi diplomatii do 2020 goda. Kontseptsia vneshnei politiki RK na 2014-2020 gg. i zadachi po ee realizatsii. Materialy kruglogo stola (April 11 2014). Almaty 2014. p. 109.

***** Sultanov B.K. Prikladnoe znachenie otkrytoi politiki. Kontseptsia vneshnei politiki RK na 2014-2020 i zadachi po ee realizatsii. Materialy kruglogo stola. (April 11 2014). Almaty 2014 p. 118.

***** Ibid.

***** Kontseptsia vneshnei politiki Respubliki Kazakhstan na 2014-2020 gody i zadachi po ee realizatsii: Materialy kruglogo stola / Edited by B.K.Sultanov — Almaty: KazISS under the President of RK, 2014 p. 21-22

portant and necessary for the state which chose a democratic way of development.

Great importance is represented by the Asian direction in creation of Kazakhstan's foreign policy, as well as expansion of a positive zone of cooperation with the states of other regions. Within ensuring regional stability and deepening of economic and political cooperation, as well as joint fight against the arising threats for Kazakhstan, the region of Central Asia comes out on top place. Such policy is extremely necessary from the point of view of promoting the national interests of the country.

Kazakhstan's wellbeing is inseparably linked with its relations with the countries neighbours. But world security systems fail on the example of the countries of the Middle East, Iraq, Afghanistan, and also Ukraine and Syria. Therefore, it is unambiguous that among priorities of Kazakhstan there is an ensuring stability in Central Asia, including the organization of collective protection against new calls and threats. In this regard Kazakhstan has made a set of efforts on deepening of integration into Central Asia. N.Nazarbayev pointed more than once that only within intraregional interaction it is possible to solve hydro-electric, transport, communication, territorial and boundary problems.

According to Kazakhstan, regional integration forms a basis for involvement of the countries of Central Asia into the process of regional cooperation and, as a result, to economic integration. Then "it is possible to begin solving really effectively common social, economic and environmental problems of the region, to strengthen commercial and transport intercourses, to raise a welfare of our people"*****. It should be noted that attempts of integration at the territory of Central Asia were more than once, however none of them were realized owing to various circumstances. It is possible to include social

and economic roughness of the countries of Central Asia, a difference of foreign policy priorities, a conjuncture, and also a personal role of the Presidents, as the Head of states determined the main directions of both internal, and foreign policy in Central Asian countries.

Special attention in the new concept is paid to multivector diplomacy and a cooperation within such organizations as the UN, OSCE, SCO, OIC, CICA, the CSTO and other subjects. Actions for transformation of CICA into the full-scale international organization*****, presidency in which passed from Turkey to China during 2014-2016, are actively implemented.

There is an opinion that the international authority of Kazakhstan increases due to Kazakhstan's participation in activities of various regional and global structures. It is logical that participation of the Republic of Kazakhstan in these or those organizations depends only on national interests in these structures. Because many Kazakhstan initiatives find support from the world community, it improves the international image of the country, raises Kazakhstan's role in the UN.

Thus, in view of intermediary efforts of the Republic of Kazakhstan in different conflicts in the territory of Eurasia, it reasonably became the non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for 2017-2018.

Unambiguously certain position of Kazakhstan in issues on arms and global safety gave Kazakhstan the chance to increase its authority as the leader for expansion of the nuclear-free world, non-proliferation of WMD. And the new Concept keeps succession of Kazakhstan's foreign policy in this matter. Moreover, the President of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev created the new special award "For Nuclear Disarmament and for a Contribution to Safety" which will be handed

***** Idrissov Y.A., Kontury kazakhstanskoi diplomatii do 2020 goda. Kontseptsiya vneshnei politiki RK na 2014-2020 gg. i zadachi po ee realizatsii. Materialy kruglogo stola (April 11 2014). Almaty 2014. p. 112.

***** Sultanov B.K., Vneshnyaya politika Respubliki Kazakhstan v sisteme globalnykh i regionalnykh trendov. Kontseptsia vneshnei politiki RK na 2014-2020 i zadachi po ee realizatsii. Materialy kruglogo stola. (April 11 2014). Almaty 2014 p. 21.

annually on August 29 — in the International day of actions against nuclear testing.

The fundamental problems which pushed the world to crises of 2007–2009, 2011 were not resolved. Therefore, it is impossible to secure itself against potential financial and economic shocks. In this regard, one of important provisions of the concept is the task of strengthening of economic diplomacy, strengthening of trade and economic position of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and improve attractiveness as regard investments in the conditions of a fierce competition and the crisis phenomena on the world scene.

Also much attention is paid to the integration process at the space of the CIS: to expansion of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Nevertheless, for Kazakhstan, firmness of sovereignty, pragmatism and mutual advantage shall remain the main principles for existence of such integration project.

The policy of Kazakhstan on deepening regional and, as a result, global integration cooperation is impossible without WTO membership on profitable terms. After twenty years of negotiations, Kazakhstan, at last, on November 30, 2015 became the 162nd full-

fledged member of the WTO. Time will show how it is really profitable to the state.

Also the fact that national and language self-determination are referred by separate points to a number of foreign policy priorities is of special importance. So Kazakhstan for the first time has documentary fixed policy of "the soft force" for promoting the Kazakh culture and language abroad.

The principles and priorities of the concept of foreign policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan confirm the bases for political multi-vector nature of the country, applied since independence.

The adequate foreign policy directly promotes maintenance of stability in the Kazakhstan society. Such interrelation indicates the integrated character of the main directions of Kazakhstan's policy^{*****} and new concept which has incorporated historical experience of previous years and generations, marks the beginning of the following stage of development for Kazakhstan diplomacy. According to many experts, Kazakhstan currently has the verified system of fundamental views on its foreign policy activity.

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^{*****} *Kaptagayev O.K.* Kopvektorlyq – Qazaqstannyn syrtqy sayasatyndagy basymdyq. Kazakhstan: politicheskie realii sovremennosti. 2009. p. 88.

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KAZAKHSTAN AND TRANSPORTATION NETWORKS OF THE FUTURE

Mikhail A. Molchanov

Professor, St. Thomas University (Canada)

Abstract. Trans-Eurasian energy transportation routes connecting countries of the Central Asia-Transcaspian region, Kazakhstan in particular, with European and East Asian markets could become a region-building instrument that would unite the wider Eurasia on primarily economic grounds, promoting peace and cooperation. Existing geopolitical divisions and mistrust between the West and the larger part of the non-western Eurasia should be overcome to enable such unification. Without a cooperative energy production and transportation regime strategic competition policies in the region will prevail, leaving everyone worse off than before. It is in this context that the project of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) becomes viable and beneficial to all member states. The EAEU currently bleak economic performance should not be taken as an indicator of its true potential. However, to make full use of the cooperative gains that the EAEU model can bring to all of its member states, regional cooperation in Eurasia should be based on economic, not political reasoning. The development of the member-states national energy sectors should proceed in coordinated fashion and under the supervision of a joint supranational body. Moreover, the EAEU potential will only flourish if the organization finds its place in the transregional networks of trade developed by the European Union, on the one side, and China, on the other side.

Key words: *Energy trade, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Eurasian Economic Union, New Silk Road.*

ҚАЗАҚСТАН ЖӘНЕ БОЛАШАҚТАҒЫ КӨЛІК ЖЕЛІЛЕРІ

Михаил Молчанов

Аңдатпа. Орталық Азия мен Каспий елдері және Қазақстанды өзара біріктіретін, сонымен қатар бұл аймақты еуропа және шығыс-азиялық нарықтармен жалғастыратын энергия көздерін тасымалдау бағыттары аймақ «қалыптастыру» құралы болып қана қоймай, Еуразияны экономикалық тұрғыдан жұмылдандыратын және бейбітшілік пен ынтымақтастықты жетілдендіретін әлеуетімен де танылады. Бұл бірлестіктің жетістікке жетуі үшін Батыс пен Еуразияның батыстық емес басым бөлігі арасындағы геосаяси қайшылықтар мен өзара сенімсіздік жойылуы тиіс. Аймақтағы энергияны өндіру

саласындағы ынтымақтастықсыз және оны тасымалдау режимінің болмауы аймақтағы стратегиялық мазмұндағы бәсекелестіктің басым болуына ықпал етіп, тиімсіз жаһандық әсерге алып келеді. Осы тұрғыдан алғанда Еуразиялық экономикалық одақ жобасы барлық мүше-мемлекеттер үшін өте қажетті және тиімді саналады. Бүгінгі таңдағы ЕЭАО-ның шамалы деңгейдегі экономикалық көрсеткіштерін оның нақты әлеуетінің белгісі ретінде қарастыру қажет емес. Бірақ, ЕЭАО аясындағы ынтымақтастық үлгісі мүмкіндіктерінің пайдасын толығымен сезіну үшін және де оның мүше-мемлекеттері тең дәрежеде көру үшін Еуразиядағы аймақтық ынтымақтастық саяси емес, экономикалық негізде жүзеге асырылуы тиіс. ЕЭАО мүше-мемлекеттерінің ұлттық энергетикалық салаларының дамуы ұлттық органнан жоғары тұрған біртұтас ортақ ұйым деңгейінде өзара үйлестірілген әрекеттер арқылы жүргізілуі керек. Сонымен қатар, ЕЭАО әлеуеті тек ұйым Еуропалық одақ пен Қытай варасындағы транс-аймақтық сауда жүйесіндегі өзіндік орнын алған кезде ғана толығымен жүзеге асырылады.

Түйінді сөздер: *энергетикалық сауда, Қазақстан, Әзірбайжан, Еуразиялық Экономикалық Одақ, Жаңа Жібек Жолы.*

КАЗАХСТАН И ТРАНСПОРТНЫЕ СЕТИ БУДУЩЕГО

Михаил Молчанов

Аннотация. Транс-евразийские маршруты транспортировки энергоносителей, соединяющие страны Центральной Азии, Каспия и Казахстан, в том числе, и с европейскими и восточно-азиатскими рынками, могут стать инструментом «построения» региона, объединяющим Евразию прежде всего по экономическим вектору, но имеющим потенциал способствовать миру и сотрудничеству. Для успеха такого объединения должны быть преодолены существующие геополитические разногласия и недоверие между Западом и большей частью незападной Евразии. Без сотрудничества в сфере производства энергии и наличия режима перевозки, конкуренции стратегического характера в регионе будет по-прежнему преобладать, приводя к негативному экуменическому эффекту. Именно в этом контексте, проект Евразийского Экономического Союза представляется жизненно необходимым и выгодным для всех государств-членов. Сегодняшние скромные экономические показатели ЕЭС не следует рассматривать как индикаторы его истинного потенциала. Однако, чтобы в полной мере использовать выгоды модели сотрудничества в рамках ЕЭС, с тем, чтобы все государства-члены ощутили их в равной степени, региональное сотрудничество в Евразии должно основываться на экономическом, а не на политическом базисе. Развитие национальных энергетических секторов стран-членов ЕЭС должно осуществляться в силу координированных действий в рамках единого наднационального органа. Кроме того, потенциал ЕЭС будет реализован полностью только тогда, когда организация найдет свое место в межрегиональной системе торговли, объединяющей Европейский союз, с одной стороны, и Китай – с другой.

Ключевые слова: *энергетическая торговля, Казахстан, Азербайджан, Евразийский Экономический Союз, Новый Шелковый Путь.*

The future of the Eurasian region is connected to the development of modern transportation infrastructure covering both human movement and commodity transportation. The principal development of oil and gas pipelines and fields in the region had only started after the end of the USSR. Azerbaijan led the way, as it signed most of the production-sharing agreements (PSAs) among all of the former Soviet Union countries. The 100,000 bbl/d (barrels of oil per day) capacity Baku–Novorossiysk pipeline started functioning in 1997; the 145,000 bbl/d Baku–Supsa pipeline was opened in 1999, and the 1,000,000 bbl/d Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline started pumping oil in 2005. Parallel to that, in 2007 Azerbaijan started exporting natural gas via the South Caucasus pipeline, also known as the Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum (BTE). The pipeline’s capacity is 300 bcf (billion cubic feet) of natural gas, potentially upgradable to more than 700 bcf.

After the 1998 merger of BP and Amoco, the newly enlarged company radially increased its activities in the Caspian Sea littoral. By 2004, BP’s interest in the ACG (Shirag) oil field in Azerbaijan exceeded 34 percent. By late 2010, BP owned 37.4 percent of operating interest in the ACG, while the sum total of the stakes controlled by the US-headquartered Chevron, Exxon and Hess amounted to 22 percent. As a result, by 2010, Britain and the USA accounted for more than half of all foreign direct investment inflows in Azerbaijan’s economy. Even though their combined share went somewhat down in subsequent years, to about 40 percent of the total FDI inflows’ volume, the United Kingdom remains the largest source of foreign direct investment for the Azeri economy. Among all of the UK-headquartered transnational corporations, BP clearly stands out as a single most important business partner and investor into Azerbaijan’s petroleum sector. Since its entrance into the local market in 1992, the company emerged as the largest foreign investor in the country.

The pipeline wars

The BP-led consortium, which includes Azerbaijan’s state oil company SOCAR (25% stake) built the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) export pipeline at an estimated cost of US\$4 billion, 70 percent of which was covered by public moneys. BP is the largest shareholder (30.1%), followed by SOCAR, Chevron (8.9%), Statoil (8.7%), TPAO (6.5%), ENI (5%), Total (5%) and others. The pipeline with the planned capacity of 50 million tonnes of oil a year was opened in 2005 and pumped 790,000 bbl/d on average in 2009. Although the pipeline capacity was expanded to 1.2 million barrels per day, or near 53 million tonnes a year, the actual volumes stayed at or near the 2009 level. In 2014, the BTC carried about 28.5 million tonnes of oil, and in 2015 – 28.8 million tonnes, 5.5 million of which came from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan (Mamedova 2016). In less than ten years of exploitation, BTC supplied near 300 million tonnes of oil to the world markets (ABC.az 2016).

The situation with the northern route has been much more dramatic. In 2013 the Russian government annulled the 1996 contract on transportation of the Azeri oil via Novorossiysk because of the chronically low volumes of transit. A new agreement was reached between Russia’s pipeline operator Transneft and Azerbaijan’s SOCAR in February 2014. Only 1.75 million tonnes of Azeri oil went through the Baku–Novorossiysk pipeline in 2013, 0.9 million tonnes in 2014 and 1.2 million tonnes in 2015. The 2016 promise of SOCAR to send at least 1.4 million tonnes to Novorossiysk may or may not come true. Both Russian and Azeri analysts agree that, whether you judge it from a political or economic perspective, the northern route might well be heading into oblivion.

With most of the Azeri oil destined for Ceyhan, Russia had refocused its attention on Kazakhstan and the east Caspian littoral. In 1992, the government of Kazakhstan entered into negotiations with the Sultanate of Oman to estab-

lish the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC). The Russian government had soon joined the deal and became the CPC third member. The project connected the western Kazakhstan oil field of Tengiz with the port of Novorossiysk – Russia’s Black Sea coast main oil terminal.

In 1996, half of the consortium shares were sold to producing companies, which included Rosneft and Lukoil, Russia’s first joint stock oil company. Other investors were Kazakhstan’s national oil company (currently, KazMunaiGas), the US-based Chevron and Mobil, British Gas, Agip S.p.A. of Italy and Oryx Energy (Qatar). The pipeline was commissioned in 2001, with a capacity of 684,000 bbl/d. After a series of consolidations, 31 percent of its shares ended up with the Russian government (24 percent managed by the oil transportation monopoly Transneft and 7 percent – by the CPC Company). Producing companies controlled by the Russian interests hold further 20 percent. Kazakhstan’s KazMunaiGas controls 19 percent of the stock. The largest international investors are Chevron, with 15 percent, and Mobil Caspian Pipeline Company, with 7.5 percent.

In 2011, CPC partners began the expansion of the pipeline capacity to 1.4 million bbl/d, or 67 million tonnes a year, to be finished in 2016 (KazMunaiGas 2015). The CPC ended up as an important instrument of Russia’s economic and political influence in the region, even as another Caspian-Black Sea oil transportation artery under Russia’s partial control, the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline, fell into relative neglect because of constant disputes between its Russian and Azeri operators.

Of course, Russia’s Gazprom still controls the 2800 bcf capacity Central Asia – Center (CAC) natural gas pipeline, commissioned more than 40 years ago. However, after many years of operation, its capacity went down by near 50 percent, to 44 billion cubic meters (bcm), or 1550 bcf approximately, by 2009 (Alexander’s Gas & Oil Connections 2009), and even deeper, to roughly one-tenth of its original throughput capacity, by 2012 (Mammadov 2015). As Azerbaijan steadily worked to overcome its former

reliance on Russia’s technological inputs and infrastructure in oil production and transportation, so did Turkmenistan, seeking to weave itself off overreliance on the Russia-controlled natural gas transportation network.

Parallel to the decline of the Russia-controlled infrastructure, the newly built oil and gas pipelines bypass Russia altogether, thus further undermining its previously unchallenged positions of Eurasia’s number one energy giant. With the steady growth in independent export capabilities of countries as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, Russia’s positions of the formerly principal exporter and transit operator for the exports of the Eurasian hydrocarbons on the world market have been eroding. Russia seems to be losing what industry analysts describe as the "pipeline war" with the West and China alike – the “war” over who gets to control the primary export routes for the Transcaspian energy resources. While the Kazakhstan-Russia CPC pipeline is still leading, having transported 42.8 million tonnes of oil in 2015, BTC over the same period pumped 29 million tonnes to Ceyhan, and the Kazakhstan-China pipeline – 11 million tonnes to China. Thus, the volumes are now roughly comparable, while in the future the other post-Soviet countries may start outpacing Russia’s oil and gas exports from the Central Asia-Transcaspian area.

The only country among the major oil and gas producers in the region that managed to maintain extensive cooperation ties with Russia, particularly via joint usage of major pipelines and oil refining facilities, is Kazakhstan, and its case is quite illustrative for both benefits and challenges of such cooperation.

Is economic integration viable? The case of Kazakhstan

By the turn of the century, Kazakhstan produced 30 million tonnes of oil and oil condensates, while Azerbaijan produced less than half this amount (Shoemaker 2013: 255; Today. Az 2005). Although the gap between the two

somewhat narrowed in 2007-2010, it increased again in 2011-2015. Kazakhstan remains by far the largest energy producer after Russia in the whole of the post-Soviet space, with a total in liquids production of 1.72 million bbl/d in 2015, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration. By comparison, Azerbaijan's average in 2015-2016 has been projected at 880,000 bbl/d (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2016).

However, Kazakhstan's growth has been handicapped by limitations inherited from the past. Historically, Kazakhstan had to rely on transportation networks and refinery facilities located in Russia. For the first few years after the proclamation of independence, all of the new republics' energy exports were heading north and north-west, to Russia; there was simply no other way to reach the world market. Throughout the first post-independence decade, the Uzen-Atyrau-Samara pipeline, with a throughput capacity of 17.5 million ton, was Kazakhstan's major export route to the world. It linked to Russia's Transneft distribution system, which delivered Kazakh oil to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk or ran it through the Druzhba pipeline, across western Russia, Belarus or Ukraine. The Black Sea route has been subject to regulation and even obstruction, on the environmental and safety grounds, by Turkey. The Druzhba route has seen periodic disputes with Ukraine over transit fees. Finally, the loss of the Kazakh oil because of theft en route became a problem with the rise of criminal activity in the Samara oblast', where the Transneft security recorded 1322 illegal siphons over ten years (Kazantseva 2013).

Kazakhstan was forced to seek diversification of its export routes. Because of the inherited vast dependency on Russia's transit network, it had to proceed decisively, yet diplomatically, without antagonizing its northern neighbour. The construction and operation of the CPC (Tengiz-Novorossiysk) pipeline provides an ample illustration. At the same time, Kazakhstan's official strategy for some time has been overcoming the one-sided reliance on one export trans-

portation route only. As early as 1995, speaking to the attendees of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev stressed that his country, being in possession of huge natural resources and qualified labor force, was considering exporting energy carriers both to the West and to the East. In his 1997 Address to the People of Kazakhstan Nazarbayev specifically stressed that "only a big number of independent export routes can prevent dependence on one neighbor and the monopolistic price dependence on one customer" (Nazarbayev 1997).

And this is how the country proceeded. In 1997, an agreement with the Chinese oil major CNPC provided for the joint development of oil fields and construction of an export pipeline to China. By 2003, Phase 1 of the future Kazakhstan-China pipeline, the Kenkiyak-Atyrau segment, was completed. By the end of 2005, the Atasu-Alashankou trunk had crossed the border with China and became Kazakhstan's first independently built export pipeline. Thus, the project's Phase 2 was completed. Phase 3 connected the Kenkiyak oil field to the Kumkol oil field in the southern part of central Kazakhstan in 2009. Tying all three sections with the Soviet-built Kumkol-Atasu line and reversing the flow of oil in the Kenkiyak-Atyrau segment from its original east-west direction to the opposite launched the next stage of the Kazakhstan-China project, which allowed doubling the original capacity of the pipeline to 20 million tons a year, or 400,000 bbl/d.

The loss of Kazakhstan's oil, now channeled eastwards, means that transportation networks to Europe may remain underutilized. Significantly, the starting point of the Kazakhstan-China pipeline is basically the same as the starting point of the Atyrau-Samara pipeline, which brings up to 15 million tonnes of oil into the Russian Transneft network annually. Hence, Russia is now competing with China over Kazakh oil. The Chinese are not happy that the 20 million tonne capacity Atyrau-Alashankou pipeline pumped less than 5 million tonnes of crude in 2015 (Delovoi Kazakhstan 2016). Russians are

concerned that the removal of sanctions on Iran will further suppress crude oil prices, making Kazakhstan to roll back production and lower the volumes of oil channeled via the CPC pipeline. Azerbaijan has been arguing for some time that the best route for the Kazakh oil to reach international markets is across the Caspian and via Baku's Sangachal Terminal, continuing to the Black Sea or the Mediterranean coast by the pipeline.

The North Caspian Operating Company (NCOC) consortium, which operates the Kashagan field, does not include Russian participants. Its members are Kazakhstan's KazMunaiGas (16.87%), transnational oil majors Exxon Mobil (16.81%) and Royal Dutch Shell (16.81%), the Italian ENI (16.81%), the French Total (16.81%), China's CNPC (8.4%), and Japanese Inpex (7.56%). Recently, they have agreed on an export strategy that would combine sales to the European Union and China. Given the fact that oil prices hit twelve-year low in January 2016 against the sluggish demand in Europe and elsewhere, the attraction of China's market grows – to the extent that Russian producers increase the supply through Kazakhstan's transit networks to China, while taking away from Russia's own Transneft system.

In both Kazakhstan itself and in the West voices have been raised doubting the economic rationale of Kazakhstan's participation in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), where western sanctions against Russia reverberated throughout the whole common economic space. The ruble's devaluation affected intra-regional trade and currencies of other EAEU member states. As a result the trade between the core countries of the EAEU – Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan – shrank by roughly one-third in the first year since the Union's inauguration.

Nonetheless, the EAEU's prospects are not necessarily bleak. In fact, Kazakhstan's economists noted certain improvements in the structure of trade, e.g. growth in the machine-building share of exports (Trotsenko 2016). The World Economic Situation and Prospects

2016 report, published by the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN/DESA), notes that the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union “opens new possibilities for increased trade and investment in the region, although many aspects of the regional integration still have to be negotiated” (United Nations 2016: 127).

The very model of Eurasian regional economic integration has to be negotiated, too. At the moment, it appears too politicized because of the precarious situation Russia finds itself in international and global politics. However, once the situation in Ukraine normalizes and western sanctions against Russia are removed, the EAEU is poised for a take-off. As US Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard E. Hoagland mentioned, “the Eurasian Economic Union should be trade-liberalizing rather than trade-restricting, should not become overly politicized, and should not impose conditions or restrictions on its members' ties with other countries” (Hoagland 2015).

Russia's trade war with the West and the worsening of economic and trade relations with Turkey severely affect Kazakhstan and create political and economic dilemmas that Astana would rather not face. One way to make sure that the EAEU will not evolve along that path of self-imposed isolationism is to combine the membership in its structures with participation in multilateral trade regimes. From this point of view, Kazakhstan's accession to the WTO is a step in the right direction. Parallel to that, an inter-regional, transcontinental linkages should be developed and strengthened. EAEU's ties to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Economic Cooperation Organization and, of course, the European Union, will help cast aside misconceptions as to the organization's purpose and future. A cooperative trade regime making full use of the region's central location on the intersection of trade routes from the east to the west and from the north to the south will boost trade and maximize the participants' welfare.

Toward the cooperative network regime

There may be two ways to deal with the problem of sellers' competition in the Eurasian regional market of energy resources: positive and negative. The first one is defined as actions by which "a seller tries to make his product cheaper, bigger, better, or more appealing to the buyer." The negative way to deal with competition include "efforts to reduce the saleability or availability of competitors' products" (Machlup 1952: 83). The Western, and more specifically, Anglo-American efforts to undermine Russia's positions in the export markets of hydrocarbons under the pretext of "diversification of supply" appear the prime example of negative competition, insofar as they attempt to reduce the availability of Russian oil and gas in the European market in particular.

The positive way to compete would be to combine the efforts of energy producers and energy infrastructure operators in the Central Asia-Transcaspian area for the purposes of joint usage of the existing transportation networks, thus replacing the "pipeline wars" mentality with the idea of regional economic cooperation and integration.

As I have argued elsewhere, the region's oil and gas reserves and the transportation networks can be seen as either a bone of contention or a unified common resource shared by all the states of the region. For both consumers and exporters' sake, it is important to construct a multilateral cooperative regime in the area. Such a regime, implemented in the form of a socioeconomic network, will allow diffusing the economies of scale effects throughout the region, and will also result in manifold positive spillovers on other sectors (Molchanov & Yevdokimov 2004).

Until a cooperative international regime for the development of the region's energy resources is created, self-serving interests of the individual actors – national governments and transnational corporations – will stall collective welfare maximization. Bilateralism will undermine multilateralism. Meanwhile, a coopera-

tive regime in the energy sector of the Central Asia-Caspian region could promote sharing of knowledge and technological transfers between the national oil and gas industries of the participating countries, as well as rapid domestication of progressive methods of work brought by foreign investors. Such a regime would reduce transaction costs and initiate economies of scale in the energy sector, while helping to strengthen security and sustainability in the area. While stopping short of cartelization, it could also improve profit margins of the national energy champions and transnational oil and gas companies currently engaged in a winner-takes-all competition for the market share.

One specific economic integration instrument that most countries of the Central Asia-Transcaspian region have at their disposal is the abundance of natural resources, oil and gas in particular. Russia is the world's largest exporter of natural gas and the second-largest exporter of oil. Kazakhstan is in the top 20 of the world's largest petroleum and other liquids producers, and Azerbaijan is in the top 25. Kazakhstan is also the world's largest producer of uranium. Turkmenistan is number 33 in the world's petroleum producers' rankings, according to the US Energy Information Administration. It is also the sixth largest natural gas reserve holder in the world according to the Oil and Gas Journal, and was among the top 15 dry natural gas producers in 2014.

It is little wonder that energy production, transportation and trade has shaped out as one industrial cluster that can help bring all these countries together, as the best possible instrument that the Eurasian Union member states may utilize to lay out a solid economic foundation for the new regional entity. Energy cooperation may potentially become the backbone of regional integration initiatives going well beyond the energy sector. The benefits that such multilateral cooperation could bring to all countries of the region, including energy producers and energy transit countries, is quite obvious. Thus, it is quite paradoxical that most energy cooperation initiatives so far were conceived

and implemented as bilateral undertakings. The Customs Union bodies have had little say over the scope and direction of energy deals between Kazakhstan and China, or Russia and the EU countries. The Eurasian Economic Community was not consulted in the bilateral negotiations between the Russian energy companies and their Central Asian counterparts. The Eurasian Economic Union today still has to show its strength as an institution independent from the Russian diktat and acting in the interests of all its members, as a truly multilateral regional entity.

Yet another regional organization with a huge economic potential of its own is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which unites China and Russia with the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Afghanistan, Belarus, India, Iran, Mongolia, and Pakistan have an observer status, and the process of admitting India and Pakistan as full members had started in July 2015. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Turkey are dialogue partners. Even the current member states, according to expert estimates, hold more than 50 percent of the world deposits of natural gas and near one quarter of the world's oil. Moreover, these states also control 35 percent of the world's coal deposits and near half of all of the uranium found on the planet (Bushuyev and Pervukhin 2012). Some of the lengthiest and most important oil and gas pipelines in the world traverse the territories of these countries: the CPC, the Kazakhstan-China, the East Siberia—Pacific Ocean (ESPO) oil pipelines and the Central Asia—China gas pipeline are well known examples.

The idea of the SCO Energy Club was proposed by Moscow back in 2006. However, the proposal remained on paper and, for some time, had not been followed through. The preference that regional players show to bilateralism over multilateralism in the energy sector was one of the reasons that delayed implementation of the promising idea. The fact that the energy sector in the post-Soviet countries is, according to some estimates, one of the most corrupt and

non-transparent industrial sectors overall did not help either. Finally, the national priorities differed. Even as all of the SCO member states subscribe to the notion of energy security, security of energy suppliers (Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan) differs from security of energy consumers (China, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan). Energy exporters implicitly compete with one another, and so do energy importers. Diversification of energy transportation routes, presumably a good thing for all, is not embraced by a dominant transit country (say, Russia or Kazakhstan) with the same degree of enthusiasm as by its partners.

As a major energy importer, China is interested in promoting regional energy cooperation in Eurasia. Chinese bilateral ties with energy-producing SCO member states have become supplemented with more active promotion of multilateralism after the formal institutionalization of the SCO Energy Club in 2013. If successful, the Energy Club could lead the way in the creation of a common energy space for the participant countries, which would require an agreement on price liberalization, standardization of energy transportation tariffs, development of a unified approach to taxation, and coordination of supply in order to avoid unnecessary competition between suppliers. In short, to grow into something more than the platform for a bilateral Russia-China dialogue with few other countries watching it may require institutionalization of a multilateral regulatory body.

At present, such a body is missing, and the Energy Club itself remains a more or less empty shell, a proposition waiting for its practical implementation. Among the SCO member states, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have not yet signed the memorandum on its creation. While Turkey participates, neither Azerbaijan nor Turkmenistan have shown much interest at this point. It is instructive that two year past its creation, Vladimir Putin had to use the platform of the SCO 2015 Ufa summit to plead with the participants about filling the Energy Club agenda with “concrete tasks.” Even more telling is the fact that a recent decision to start the construc-

tion of a major, 33 bcm a year Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) natural gas pipeline was reached without any mediation or involvement of the SCO structures. Similarly, the construction of the 16 bcm Trans-Anatolian natural gas pipeline (TANAP) and the work on the South Caucasus Pipeline Expansion (SCPX) project started upon the conclusion of the agreement between Azerbaijan and Turkey, and, once again, heeding of the third power preferences had not played a major part in the outcome of the bilateral negotiations.

Connecting to the New Silk Road

In a recent article Russia's reputed periodical Expert Online suggests China is pushing Russia to link its Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) project with China's plans for the New Silk Road -- a transcontinental network of railroads and highways allowing direct transit of China's exports to the European Union. The article draws a picture of Russia's reluctant acceptance of the inevitable Chinese expansion to the west and the subordinate role that the EAEU will play in such expansion.

The reality is somewhat different. The linking of the two projects will give a huge boost to the EAEU development and bring direct dividends to the Russian economy in particular. The speculations of whether China will prefer the so-called "northern route" (via Russia) or the "southern route" (via Turkey) for the land transit of its goods will be put to rest. It will use both.

Moreover, both Russia and China will be well advised to develop the "in-the-middle" option, which will streamline the transit and shorten the travel time comparing to other alternatives. This third route would go via Kazakhstan and the southern Russia (or Georgia), across the Crimean peninsula and then, by a short ferry, to the Black Sea ports of the EU members Bulgaria and Romania.

The Expert Online article mentions China's Silk Road Fund investments in Russia, of which the most noticeable so far has been buy-

ing of the 9.9% stake in the liquefied natural gas (LNG) Yamal project in Russia's Far North. The opening of a plant for the production of refrigerators of the Chinese Corporation Haier in Tatarstan is another noteworthy project.

Yet the bigger prizes lie elsewhere. China may facilitate construction of the Kerch Strait bridge by the Russian contractors by giving both money and know-how. The bridge, to be completed by 2018, will connect Russia's mainland with Crimea. China may further invest into the development of Russia's Azov-Black Sea port infrastructure and the Ukrainian port of Odessa, while extending a trunk of it New Silk Road via Ukraine. Beijing's money may cool heads in both Kiev and Moscow, thus facilitating the Ukrainian-Russian rapprochement.

The Kerch Strait bridge project was once approved by Ukraine's government, only to be denounced after the Maidan revolution. Perhaps, Kiev will reconsider its decision if granted a share in the international consortium that may still be established for the joint exploitation of the bridge. After all, Ukraine's attempts to challenge the construction of the bridge by means of an international legal action will probably lead to nothing. Yet, Ukraine's demanding a piece of action because of its rights to the internal waters of the Sea of Azov may still work.

Of course, it leaves the larger question of sovereignty over Crimea and the legality of its annexation by Russia open for the time being. Ukraine will never accept the legality of annexation nor should it. But, as the example of Taiwan shows, unofficial acceptance of the status quo does not require renunciation of sovereignty, and in the meantime both sides derive substantial benefits from normalization of their cross-Strait relations. Perhaps, this may serve as an example to follow.

Conclusion

Trans-Eurasian energy transportation routes connecting countries of the Central Asia-Transcaspian region, the member-states of the Eurasian Economic Union, and the broader Shang-

hai Cooperation Organization community could become that region-building instrument that would unite the wider Eurasia on primarily economic grounds. Existing geopolitical divisions and mistrust between the West and the larger part of the non-western Eurasia prevent such unification. Without a cooperative energy production and transportation regime strategic competition (beggar-thy-neighbour) policies in the region will prevail.

Regional coordination is necessary to transcend the inbound, self-interested behavior of individual business players and national states for the sake of welfare maximization on a transnational, regional level. It is well known that cooperation brings larger collective benefits than any form of strategic competition that seeks to maximize benefits of one player at the expense of the others. Competition policy experts argue that “a change from inbound-, national-welfare-focused competition policies to such pursuing supranational and suprajurisdictional welfare goals, as well as cooperation on concrete, specified cases, is necessary from an economic perspective. However, both topics are hardly compatible with the contemporary governance principles...” (Budzinski 2015: 141).

In the absence of regional coordination, market development proceeds under conditions of anarchy. Large-scale infrastructure projects, such as the construction of transcontinental oil and gas pipelines, require massive investments of money, labour, technology and know-how and can only be successful on the basis of at least some cross-border, international cooperation. Any project of such scale and nature should be based on a comprehensive preliminary assessment, scrupulous planning and purposeful self-organization among producer groups to limit market anarchy and reduce the attendant risks (Jessop 2015).

One way to reduce the arising uncertainty is through the harmonization, or approximation of policies; creation of a more or less uniform international policy regime with a properly authorized international agency at its helm. The WTO regime may serve as an example of harmoniza-

tion of policies along these lines. Another way is policy coordination, or the establishment of a functioning regime of systematic multilateral cooperation based on mutually agreed-upon rules of behaviour “around which expectations converge” (Young 1980: 332). Such rules must be followed by all participants voluntarily and without any one of them taking upon itself the task to enforce the rules in an authoritative fashion. This is a path of soft regulation by means of joint elaboration of standards, their voluntary acceptance and implementation, negotiations of individually tailored modifications of policy and/or partial exceptions as necessary, and carrying out of multilaterally acceptable agreements that are based on the principle of fair treatment of all of the participants.

Of course, countries of the Eurasian hinterland are vastly different in terms of size, economic potential and geographic location. For most Central Asian states today, China is more important than Russia. The transportation potential of these countries also varies greatly. Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are landlocked countries; Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have direct access only to the inland Caspian Sea; India, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey are all sea powers, and Russia's shores are washed by three oceans. The rail density, according to the World Bank data, varies from 2.2 km or rail line per 1,000 square kilometres of land area in Kyrgyzstan to 4.4 in Tajikistan, 5.2 in Russia, 5.4 in Kazakhstan, 9.85 in Uzbekistan, 22.7 in Georgia, 25 in Azerbaijan and near 27 in Belarus.

Azerbaijan in particular is very well positioned to develop as a major transportation hub for both energy and cargo traffic. The Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) railway project, to open the rail cargo transport in 2017, will become the shortest route connecting Asia to Europe. Adding to the existing Trans-Caspian transport route, the BTK serves China's ambitions of resurrecting the ancient Silk Road under Beijing's current One Belt, One Road initiative. The \$40 billion Silk Road Fund that China had established to finance infrastructure projects in

Central Asia will further improve the east-west transportation links.

Azerbaijan is also a key member of the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) connecting northern Europe to India via Russia and Iran. Other INSTC members include Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Oman, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Ukraine. Bulgaria has an observer status. The successful activation of the corridor is expected to help connect India to Russia within 16 to 21 days at competitive freight rates. At the January 2016 meeting in Baku Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iran and Ukraine signed a memorandum of understanding on implementing the INSTC project along the third – western – route via Georgian Black Sea ports of Batumi and Poti, in addition to the already tested Caspian shore routes via Russia.

What it shows is that, although political-economic interests of the Eurasian countries with

respect to the improvement of their transportation options essentially coincide, concrete ways to implement various particular projects may differ and even work at cross purposes. Rather than being complementary, these countries' economic policies are frequently at odds with each other. If Russia would like to consolidate oil and gas transportation infrastructure on a regional basis, others are much more interested in diversification of the export-import routes than their consolidation. China and India compete for the Caspian oil and gas supplies, while Iran competes with other petroleum-exporting nations as a major supplier. The cooperative development of the SCO Energy Club could help resolve some of these issues. The necessity to consolidate the region without reducing national welfare of any single state dictates creation of a cooperative energy transportation regime on a truly multilateral basis.

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TERRORISM AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE POLITICAL AGENDA OF KAZAKHSTAN AND KYRGYZSTAN

Anastassiya Reshetnyak

Research Fellow at the KazISS under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Master's degree in Regional Studies

Abstract. This paper includes some results of the research conducted in the framework of U. Kassenov grant. Author gives short comparative characteristics for the political aspect of counter-terrorism and counter-extremism in two states of Central Asia. While these threats are becoming more and more sense on the agenda of the two countries, there are significant problems in attitudes and perceptions of the political establishment of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

Keywords: *Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Terrorism, Extremism, Religious policy*

ҚАЗАҚСТАН МЕН ҚЫРҒЫЗСТАННЫҢ САЯСИ КҮН ТӘРТІБІНДЕ ТҮРҒАН ТЕРРОРИЗМ МЕН КҮШТІК ЭКСТРЕМИЗМ

Анастасия Решетняк

Аңдатпа. Мақалада Ө. Қасенов атындағы грант аясында жасалынған зерттеу жұмысының бірқатар нәтижелері ұсынылған. Автор Орталық Азияның екі мемлекетіндегі терроризм мен экстремизммен күресудің саяси аспектісіне қысқаша компаративтік сипаттама береді. Бұл екі елдің күн тәртібіндегі аталған қатерлердің күн санап маңызды мәнге ие болуы оларға қатысты ұстанымдар мен саяси истеблишменттің қабылдауы тұрғысынан айтарлықтай сұрақтар туындатып отыр.

Түйінді сөздер: *Қазақстан, Қырғызстан, терроризм, экстремизм, діни саясат*

ТЕРРОРИЗМ И НАСИЛЬСТВЕННЫЙ ЭКСТРЕМИЗМ В ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ ПОВЕСТКЕ ДНЯ КАЗАХСТАНА И КЫРГЫЗСТАНА

Анастасия Решетняк


Аннотация. В статье представлены некоторые результаты исследования, проведенного в рамках гранта У. Касенова. Автор дает краткую компаративную характеристику политическому аспекту борьбы с терроризмом и экстремизмом в двух государствах Центральной Азии. В то время как в повестке дня этих двух стран указанные угрозы приобретают всё больший вес, существуют значительные проблемы в подходах и восприятии их в политическом истеблишменте.

Ключевые слова: *Казахстан, Кыргызстан, Терроризм, Экстремизм, Религиозная политика*

Terrorism and violent extremism have become the most disputable threats all around the world. The reason of it is a growth of instability in the Middle East, increasing level of radicalization, crisis of world governance. Central Asia, as a part of international globalization process, is also affected by these negative trends.

Despite the fact that CA states had some of the lowest rates in the Global index of terrorism

during 2015-2016 (Kazakhstan and Tajikistan took 83 and 84 places in the world rankings, Kyrgyzstan - 86, and Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are in the lowest position with zero terrorist activity [1]), and terrorist activity in the region reduces every year (see Pic. 1), the issues of terrorism and religious extremism attract greater attention at all levels of governments and societies of Central Asian republics.



Picture 1. Global Terrorism Index in Central Asia, 2012-2016 [2][3][4][5]

Methodology

Theoretical and methodological basis of the research is securitization theory within the Copenhagen School of International Relations. Barry Buzan, one of the leading scientists working in this field, considers identity of state or society as a particular construct that is not static, able to be transformed according to ideas and meanings declared within a given society or state, and other subjects' of international relationship beliefs about it. Safety is defined as a social concept, a prerequisite of which is the presence of an existential threat to the object.

An important aspect of security within the framework of this theory is securitization – “the discursive process through which an inter-subjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat” [6]. In this context, it is clear that perception of terrorism and religious extremism problems, and reflection of it in the discourse on different levels causes a certain level of its securitization in government policy and public opinion. The aim of this paper is to compare Kazakhstani and Kyrgyzstani policy-makers' approaches for better understanding this phenomenon.

Conceptual documents and structure

In Kazakhstan, current State Program on prevention terrorism and religious extremism on 2013-2017 is nearing completion, so it is possible to sum up its results. There were three key indicators to reach the goal. The first indicator – anti-terrorist awareness level of Kazakhstani society that meant to be 99.5-100%. The second one is the ratio of terrorism acts prevented at the stage of preparation (95-100%). The third indicator is the degree of readiness to minimize and eliminate the consequences of extremist and terrorist activity – will amount to 100% in 2017. Several articles of the Program are strictly confidential, but most efforts on coun-

tering these threats are focused on prevention of radicalization including youth education and especially correct perception of information about religion. The main aim of the Program is to create a society with “immune” to radical ideology.

It is prescribed that 100 per cent of Kazakhstani people must be informed about a danger from “destructive religious sects”. For this purpose, several hundreds of “information-propaganda groups” containing theologians, psychologists, lawyers, power structures and civil society representatives, etc. conduct explanatory activities all over the country. Social programs and economic opportunities for youth (especially for representatives of vulnerable and marginalized groups) is also a significant part of the Program.

Conspicuously, in both countries anti-extremism and counter-terrorism policy is inextricably bounds up with religious policy. “Traditional Islam” concept becomes the only counter-narrative for radical ideology. By this is meant the form of this religion practiced by Kazakhs and Kyrgyz people before XX century – Hanafi school of Islam mixed with different elements of ethnic culture, including folklore, customs, traditional food and clothes.

These ideas are provided by Spiritual Directorate of the Muslims (of Kazakhstan/Kyrgyzstan), (DUMK) – specific semi-government structure, unifying all the registered mosques of the country. The leader of DUMK – supreme mufti, is able to control budget and approve preaching texts, to form religious narration alleged in official mosques. This type of state-religion relationship is typical for Soviet time: predecessor of DUMK – Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan (SADUM) established in 1947 and existed for nearly 50 years. In large part because of strength of these organizations in contemporary Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and also within “Islam renaissance” in post-Soviet Central Asia, religion has become a part of state politics, despite of secular status of each regional state declared by Constitution.

The most illustrative example of this trend is Kyrgyzstani program documents. Despite the fact that there is no separate document on preventing terrorism in Kyrgyzstan, this problem is also on the top of political discourse. Radicalization theme has, for example, a high position in the Conception of national policy in the religious sphere of the Kyrgyz Republic on 2014-2020.

In this document, outstanding cultural role of Hanafi Islam is captured:

*“Hanafi madhhab, traditionally professed by Central Asian nations is distinguished from other schools of thought and movements of Islam because of its **religious tolerance that does not oppose the Islamic values to national traditions and customs; it is the ideological basis for partnership development with the state.** This allowed traditional Islam to coexist with the state without apparent conflict in the Soviet period, despite active atheistic propaganda”.*

In 2011 in Kazakhstani legislation a law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations” (1992) has been substituted by a law “On religious activity and religious associations” [for further information, see Podoprighora R.A. Kommentarij k Zakonu Respubliki Kazahstan «O religioznoj dejatel'nosti i religioznyh ob#edinenijah» - Astana, 2012, 154 p.]. In current law, in the same way as for Kyrgyzstan, there is a special mention of “traditional” religions for Kazakhstani society. The preamble is read as follows:

*“This Law is based on the fact that the Republic of Kazakhstan proclaims itself to be a democratic, secular state, confirms the right of everyone to freedom of conscience and guarantees the equality of everyone, regardless of his religious convictions, **it recognizes the historical role of Islam Hanafi direction and Orthodox Christianity in the development of culture and spiritual life of the people, respect other religions, combined with the spiritual heritage of the people of Kazakhstan, recognizes the importance of interfaith harmony, religious tolerance and respect for religious beliefs of citizens”.***

Therefore, such legislative improvements in both countries may be described as an effort to

rehabilitate this religion that faces with growing islamophobia all around the world [for more details, see Doklad «Islamofobiya i jazyk vrazhdy v SMI i Internetе KR». URL: <http://www.ca-mediators.net/ru/209-doklad-islamofobiya-i-yazyk-vrazhdy-v-smi-i-internete-kr-by-l-predstavlen-na-forume-v-bishkeke.html>].

Discourse of officials

In the foreign policy of Kazakhstan aspect of terrorism and extremism is actualized in the framework of international organizations, on a bilateral level. Kazakhstan traditionally presents itself as a driver of peaceful movements and initiatives. For example, Congress of World Religions initiated by Nazarbayev held round table with representatives of different world religions in Astana, in order to enhance dialogue and tolerance between traditional religions.

Content analysis of the President of RK public speeches showed that 72% of them contained the words “terrorism” and/or “extremism”. The threat of terrorism, according to the last Address to the nation, is one of characteristics of a “new global reality” [7]. According to the results of evaluation of texts submitted to akorda.kz site during 2014-2015, a pivotal role in the discourse of N. Nazarbayev played the emotional impact on the listener. Argument valuation and policy statements are dominated in the structure; directive speech acts (instructions, regulations, and setting standards) inherent internal political texts and commissive (promises, ads) – in the foreign policy. Key political propositions declared by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan can be divided into:

- the need for a preventive struggle against terrorism, extremism and radicalism at all levels;
- the need to improve counteract tools inside Kazakhstan;
- the need for international cooperation aimed at achieving a higher level of collective security in the face of terrorism and extremism.

N. Nazarbayev’s speech at the 70th UN General Assembly most clearly illustrates the last point: he made a proposal to establish, under

the auspices of the UN, unified global network to counter international terrorism and extremism. [8] This trend became widespread also in the domestic political discourse. "... We actively operate against terrorism within the framework of the UN Security Council, OSCE, SCO, CIS, CSTO and others" [9], noted Prime Minister of Kazakhstan Karim Masimov. It is emphasized that these organizations are not sufficiently effective in countering existing challenges and threats, and they need to update their tools and mechanisms. First of all, a comprehensive convention on the fight against violent extremism and terrorism must be accepted. This document would define a strategy and legal framework against terrorism and extremism, a joint work combating the financing of destructive sects, propaganda and illegal border crossing.

In general, the state plays a leading role in the fight against international terrorism in Kazakhstan's political discourse; it is the "protector". However, this concept provides affiliation to the state and civil society, the efforts of non-governmental organizations and high consciousness of each individual citizen.

Securitization of terrorism and extremism in the Kyrgyz Republic on the domestic level seems to be higher than in Kazakhstan. Thus, the President of Kyrgyzstan A. Atambayev meets regularly with representatives of law enforcement and national security agencies. Kyrgyz theologian K. Malikov was mentioned twice in the press releases during last year, the head of state discussed with him the level and nature of existing threats.

The following patterns were identified from the analysis of political texts voiced by the President of the Kyrgyz Republic A. Atambayev on 2014-2015:

- the fight against extremism and terrorism is treated as "the most important task of strengthening the statehood and national security";
- activities of terrorist and religious extremist groups is a threat to stability in the country. Also raise the problem of terrorist financing issues, this threat is used as a tool of

political struggle in the country: "... not only illiterate thugs, but some politicians for the sake of power and money are willing to sacrifice peace in our land, and even to sacrifice the people, by the people of Kyrgyzstan" [10];

- religious extremism contrasted with nationalism: "We believe that Islam will always be in the world. But at the same time, we are Kyrgyzs! <...> ... We are ready to take decisive steps to protect and preserve our people, our land, our language, our national culture. Everyone should remember this!" [ibid.].

In the same way as at the level of legislation and policy documents, terminological gaps can be seen in the Kyrgyz President discourse. There is a mix of concepts: "Where there is the science, where there is education, there is no place for terrorism. The roots of radicalism and terrorism are in ignorance and obscurantism" [11] - said Atambayev.

In Kyrgyzstan, the society is in the focus of countering terrorism; state and its institutions in the political discourse play the role of "victim", using relevant phrases, such as "attempted stability", "undermining the regime," and so on. Security forces play one of the key roles; in the meantime the importance of "soft" component in the fight against the threat of terrorist and extremist nature is stressed.

Methods of dealing with terrorism and religious extremism

During last three years, legislative pressure increased in all the countries of the region. In Kazakhstan, the reform concerned the penalties for people involved in hostilities abroad and preparation of militants and extremists. Criminal liability would include imprisonment from three years to life imprisonment and the death penalty [12]. The last one – maximum sentence of criminal penalty – has been already applied to "Almaty shooter" Ruslan Kulekbayev.

Representatives of state bodies consider the lack of definitions as key problems in the legal basis. In Kazakhstan, extremism is defined as "committing extremist actions" and "an act

on behalf of organizations deemed extremist" [13]. Thus, the boundaries of the application of such laws are too vague and include a very wide range of offenses, from conducting a full-scale terrorist activity until a hypothetical threat to the national dignity and morality of citizens.

Among the reasons that push citizens of Kazakhstan on illegal activities of extremist and terrorist organizations, the officials name:

- unfavorable socio-economic environment;
- lack of religious literacy;
- destructive activities of pseudo-religious groups.

The country's political establishment members have repeatedly designated the need to enhance cooperation of state bodies with NGOs; highlighted the role of communities and families in the prevention of radicalization, particularly among young people. However, today in Kazakhstan the policy on combating religious extremism and terrorism mainly applies to power and prohibitive measures [14]:

- blocking certain sites and pages by NSC (National Security Committee) (this measure is under criticism due to its low process ability. For instance, LiveJournal blogging platform has been blocked in Kazakhstan for several years due to the fact that there was a blog of Rakhat Aliyev);
- DUMK sites (today there are over 25 Internet resources of DUMK branches and their accounts on popular social networks, spiritual and educational sites: E-islam.kz and Islam.kz);
- online-monitoring of "dangerous" content conducted by the Committee of Religious Affairs under the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Civil Society (before November, 2015 this department has belonged to the Ministry of Culture and Sports) of Kazakhstan;
- more than 700 "information-propaganda" (advocacy) groups, consisting of clergy, theologians, teachers, psychologists, etc. conduct public lectures, publish educative content (since 2013; activity reports are unavailable).

In Kyrgyzstan, the legal regulation of the fight against terrorism and extremism is carried out through the following documents:

- Law of the Kyrgyz Republic «On Countering Extremist Activity" (2005);
- Law of the Kyrgyz Republic «On Combating Terrorism" (2006);
- National Security Concept of the Kyrgyz Republic (2012).

A common problem of these regulatory documents is also the blurring of terminology, as well as mixing the concepts of "extremism", "terrorism", "radicalism", "Islamization", etc. For example, in Kyrgyzstan National Security Concept, the threat of terrorism and extremism is described as follows:

"Religious extremism and international terrorism currently represents a massive threat to the Kyrgyz Republic. Inherently, religious extremist and terrorist organizations consolidate their power on a single extremist ideology and become internationalized powerful criminal structures having a wide network of like-minded people in our country.

To implement its plans to accelerate the Islamization and radicalization Central Asian countries by international extremist and terrorist structures, with the hidden support of a number of Muslim states, used numerous category missionaries and foundations, the media and Internet resources, imported extremist literature and other indoctrination attributes of the population" [15].

As seen from the excerpts, Islamization is equal to the threat to society on an equal basis with the radicalization of Kyrgyzstan. Religious extremism and international terrorism are well mixed with each other; there are no clear boundaries of these terms usage. In addition, there is no distinction between extremism and violent extremism in the Concept, i.e. this is the recognition that people with extremist views can reject violence as a way to achieve their goals.

Finally, the most aggressive is discourse of defense and law enforcement agencies of both states. In Kazakhstan, representatives of such structures, above all, actualize the risks linked with transfer of activities of radical groups into the territory of the Republic, the recruitment and illegal activities of citizens of Kazakhstan

within the country and abroad. In addition, they often refer to the need for reform of the criminal and administrative law in this area, improving terrorist activity suppression procedures.

A striking example of the discourse at this level is a statement of N. Abykayev, the Chairman of the National Security Committee of Kazakhstan: "... we are faced with massive recruitment, propaganda ideology of extremism and terrorism through the Internet, through an illegal entry of extremist literature and various missionaries into the country <...> Owing to the lack of religious literacy these ideas contribute to the radicalization of a part of faithful people, especially those who have recently come to Islam. Some of them <...> are starting to think about the participation in the so-called jihad. <...> We are not inclined to consider as normal, if our citizens are war criminals, terrorists and die away from home. <...> It is possible that some of these people, entangled in the spiritual and moral guide, received skills of terrorist activity and the destruction of their own kind, can return with mutilated consciousness and not the best of intentions ". [16]

Similar situation can be seen in equivalent structures of Kyrgyzstan. Those authorities use expressions such as "declaration of war", "information-psychological impact", "sabotage and terrorist struggle", etc. to explain radicalization processes inside the state.

"The issue of radicalization is extremely relevant not only for Kyrgyzstan, but for the entire region. We see that our citizens take part in various terrorist organizations. No one is immune from extremism [17] "- says Emil Jeenbekov, head of the 10th Main Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior of the Kyrgyz Republic. Civil servants express even harsher positions. Thus, the chairman of the State Drug Control Service R. Mambetaliyev at a briefing stated that "Any drug trafficking is accompanied by extremism and terrorism".

Such value judgements show a lack of understanding of threats and challenges, and their broadcast in the media may lead to an incorrect public perception of the problem.

Conclusion

Today, the problem of terrorism and extremism has become a part of the discursive reality worldwide. More and more time on television is devoted to the issues associated with them, the speeches of world leaders and even in everyday communication – it is a global trend.

Over the past 5 years in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, a package of laws regulating religious policy and anti-terrorist, anti-extremist activity of the state have been accepted. Extremism and terrorism are increasingly mentioned in the speeches of the highest state officials, representatives of the clergy, both of these categories see the solution to the problem in the first place in tightening policy, zero tolerance for terrorists and extremists who are the threat of the existing government and the people.

If in Kyrgyz political discourse of terrorism and religious extremism are primarily internal, and the need for multilateral dialogue and cooperation is mediated, Kazakhstan (especially Nursultan Nazarbayev personally) considers the problem on a global scale, recognizing the key role of the international community, global and regional partners in its solution. At the same time Kazakhstan is positioned as the initiator of the dialogue, the innovator and mediator in conflict resolution.

Since the fight against international terrorism and religious extremism firmly established in official and public discourse, there is a wrong interpretation of acts of extremism as terrorism, and therefore directly affect national security.

Excessive levels of securitization of the above problems can be dangerous for both the government, losing sight of the immediate causes of these processes, and to society, as violent extremism and terrorism does "normal" way to solve social and economic problems, clarify the relationship with the authorities.

The problems identified during the study - the identification of the Islamization of radicalization and even terrorism in all discourse levels - can be solved only by means of legislative consolidation of the terms "extremism" and

"terrorism", increasing professionalism of journalists covering such delicate topics, as well as literacy in these matters.

While officials of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz authorities are pursuing a policy of tightening the religious sphere, introducing new restrictions on the activities of religious organizations, the protest continues to grow among young people, which is one of the most ideologically and psychologically vulnerable group in society.

Today, the main tasks of the aforementioned states should include creating a favorable social and economic environment for young people and other vulnerable groups, searching for a

modern and ardent national (or even regional) idea generation and supporting civil society and the developing of communities having their own immunity to the destructive trends.

At the international level, first and foremost, the forces should focus on improving mutual trust and developing a common strategy for combating terrorism, harmonization of definitions of terrorism and extremism and measures to counter them.

In addition, the obvious fact that the states of the region are in need of large-scale political reforms to expand freedom of the secular opposition and liberalization policies against religious institutions.

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Guide for authors

1. General Provisions

1.1. The Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan publishes scientific articles in «Қоғам және Дәуір» (in Kazakh language), «Казakhstan-Спектр» (in Russian language), “Central Asia’s Affairs” (in English language) journals.

2. Manuscript Submission Procedure

2.1. For Editorial Board to approve the article for publication in journal, the authors need to submit to the editorial office the following:

- Manuscript of the article;
- 1 external review;

2.2. the Editorial office accepts the manuscript of the article for consideration that is sent to the following e-mail editor@kisi.kz.

The material of the article – the text including an abstract in Kazakh, Russian and English languages, images and tables, the list of references shall constitute a single file. The separate page shall contain information on authors, their full name including their posting address, telephone number, e-mail and also on author who is responsible for correspondence.

3. Requirements for the article length

3.1. Length of the article:

- **research (applied) article:** 8-20 pages, 4-6 images (tables);
- **review article** including abstracts, tables, images, the list of references should not exceed 15-25 pages, quantity of images and tables should not exceed 9 (3 images constitute 1 page);
- **theoretical article:** 10-20 pages, 4-6 images (tables);

3.2. Text files should be submitted in MS Word (Word 6.0 and later versions) where the font is Times New Roman, the point size is 14, the line spacing is 1.0, and in a single column.

4. Manuscript Structure

The article should have the following structure:

1) Code of SCSTI (State Categories Scientific and Technical Information) is placed in the upper left corner of the first page (is given in the university library);

2) Full name of authors;

D.K. Tokhtarov¹, E.M.Zhumagulov¹, E.B. Aydarbekova², S.N.Daribekov³

¹ The Karaganda State University after the academician E. A. Buketov, (Karaganda, Kazakhstan)

² L.N.Gumilyov Eurasian National University (Astana, Kazakhstan) (Astana, Kazakhstan)

³ Nazarbayev University (Astana, Kazakhstan)

3) Position, name of organization/place of work of author, city, country; if there are several authors of article, then information should be given as follows:

4) Title - should be as short as possible, informative, without abbreviations and should correspond to its content.

5) Abstract and key words should be given in 3 languages. The text length of abstract is determined by the content of the publication (amount of information, their scientific value and/or practical value) but **should not be less than 150-200 words**.

6) Text of article should have the following structure:

6.1 Introduction: short narrative of the history of issue, review of the literature, the aim, tasks and hypothesis of research.


6.2 Research Methods: new methods should be described in details. (0,5 to 3 pages)

6.3 Research findings: key theoretical and practical (applied) findings, actual data, discovered interrelations and patterns, their practical value should be discussed.

6.4 Discussion of findings: the findings should be discussed in comparison with international experience and key achievements in concrete field.

6.5 Conclusions: research should be summarized, the novelty and topicality of research should be substantiated, recommendations for practical application should be given.

6.6 Source of Research Funding: institutions, funds, individuals etc. should be listed before the list of references. The names of the funding organizations should be given in full.



6.7 List of references: list of references should conform to GOST 7.1-2003 format. (example is provided below).

Note: Tables should be numbered using Arabic numerals and have a descriptive title. The images should have a short title giving accurate description to the images. The image title should not be placed on illustrations. Scanned and graphic materials from the internet should not be used in article.

5. Procedure of working with articles (Peer review, editorial preparation, proofreading)

5.1 The authors are sent a notification by e-mail indicating the date of receiving and the registration number of the article within 10 working days from the date of receiving the manuscript by the editorial office.

5.2 Manuscripts are examined by the editor to meet the theme and the requirements of the journal within 20 working days. After remarks on article design by editorial office are addressed, the manuscript is sent for review.

5.3 Upon delivery of the manuscript to the editorial office, authors are encouraged to indicate two potential referees (their academic rank, degrees, mailing address, phone numbers, e-mail) who are specialists in particular field of research. Editorial office reserves the right to appeal to those indicated or other reviewers.

5.4 The manuscript is sent for review to two independent scientists or specialists in a particular field of research. The Editorial Board can make a decision based on expert conclusions as follows: to publish the material as presented; to send it for rework; to reject it. The manuscript sent to authors for rework should be resubmitted in a revised form within a period of 10 working days. If that period expires, it is considered a new submission. A letter from authors describing corrections made and containing answers to all the remarks by reviewers should be attached to revised manuscript. Manuscripts are not given back to authors. The editorial office has the right not to enter into correspondence with the author regarding the causes (reasons) of rejection to publish the article. The editorial office reserves the right to reduce the length of articles and to proofread them when it is necessary. After publication the author can obtain a copy of article in PDF format.

The editorial office complies with the editorial ethics and does not disclose the process of working on an article in publishing house without the consent of the author (does not discuss with anyone the value or the flaws of work, remarks and corrections to them, does not show the internal reviews to anyone).



Information about Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies Under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (KazISS) was established on June 16, 1993 by the Decree of the President of Kazakhstan. In April 2014, the President Nazarbayev issued the Executive Order to relocate the KazISS to Astana.

Since its foundation, the mission of the KazISS as the national research institution is to provide analytical support to the President of Kazakhstan as well as to government bodies of Kazakhstan.

The KazISS enjoys a reputation of the leading think tank of Kazakhstan as it employs a highly professional pool of experts that currently includes six doctors and ten candidates of sciences and Ph.Ds who specialize in political science, history, economics and sociology.

During the twenty-three two years of its functioning, the KazISS have published more than 250 books on issues of international relations, global and regional security. The Institute publishes three journals: the Kogam zhane Dayir in Kazakh, the Kazakhstan-Spectrum in Russian and the Central Asia's Affairs in English. The KazISS has a trilingual website in Kazakh, Russian, English.

Special interest has been triggered by a great number of international conferences, seminars and round tables held at the KazISS on regular basis - including the Annual Conferences regularly held since 2003 – that are participated by most prominent experts from Kazakhstan, Central Asia as well as China, France, Germany, Japan, India, Iran, Russia, Pakistan, Turkey, the USA and other countries.

KazISS enters Global Think Tank Index in Security and International Affairs Analysis Category

Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (KazISS) was ranked in four nominations 2015 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report.

The Think Tank Index is a part of the “Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program” (TTCSP) at the University of Pennsylvania that has been conducting research on the role policy institutes play in governments and civil societies around the world over the last 25 years. The pool of scholars and practitioners produce the annual Global Go To Think Tank Index that ranks more than 6 000 world's leading think tanks in a variety of categories.

The new Think Tank Index (http://repository.upenn.edu/think_tanks/10/), ranked the KazISS among the top 100 in terms of security, defense and international affairs analysis. For the first time, the KazISS was ranked the 57th among the world's best government affiliated think tanks.

In the Central Asian regional rankings, the KazISS retains its position among the top three and it is also ranked the 33d in the energy and raw materials analysis ranking.

All these signifies the increasing role of analytical centers in Kazakhstan. The publications and other materials published by Kazakhstan think tanks are citing abroad more frequently.

For any further information, contact us:

4, Beybitshilik St.
Astana, 010000
Republic of Kazakhstan
Tel: +7 (717) 75-20-20
Fax.: +7 (717) 75-20-21
E-mail: office@kisi.kz
www.kisi.kz

Қазақстан Республикасының Президенті жанындағы Қазақстанның стратегиялық зерттеулер институты туралы ақпарат

Қазақстан Республикасының Президенті жанындағы Қазақстанның стратегиялық зерттеулер институты (ҚСЗИ) Қазақстан Республикасы Президентінің 1993 жылғы 16 маусымдағы Жарлығымен құрылған. 2014 жылдың сәуір айынан ҚР Президентінің Жарлығымен Астана қаласына көшірілді.

Қазақстан Республикасының Президентінің жанындағы Қазақстанның стратегиялық зерттеулер институтының құрылған күнінен бастап оның негізгі мақсаты — мемлекеттік ғылыми-зерттеу мекемесі ретінде Қазақстан Президентінің және елдің басқарушы органдарының қызметін ғылыми-талдаулармен қамтамасыз ету.

Осы уақыт барысында ҚСЗИ жоғары кәсіби ғылыми-талдау орталығына айналды. Бүгінгі таңда институтта алты ғылым докторы, он ғылым кандидаты, Ph.D, саясаттану, тарих, экономика, әлеуметтану салаларының мамандары қызмет атқарады.

ҚСЗИ өзінің 23 жылдық қызметі барысында институт сарапшыларының қатысуымен халықаралық қатынас, ғаламдық және аймақтық қауіпсіздік мәселелері бойынша 250-ден астам кітап басып шығарған. Институт үш мерзімді ғылыми-сараптамалық журнал басып шығаруда: «Қоғам және Дәуір» тоқсандық ғылыми-сараптамалық журналы, «Казахстан-Спектр» тоқсандық ғылыми журналы және «Central Asia's Affairs» тоқсандық сараптамалық журналы (ағылшын тілінде).

Бұл басылымдарда сыртқы және ішкі саясат, халықаралық қатынастар, ұлттық қауіпсіздік, Қазақстан Республикасының әлеуметтік және экономикалық саясаты мәселелері жарық көреді, сондай-ақ материалдарды өзінің www.kisi.kz сайтында жариялайды. ҚСЗИ-дың жеке сайты үш тілде: қазақ, орыс және ағылшын тілдерінде ұсынылған. Институт өзінің негізгі зерттеу бағыттары бойынша семинарлар, ғылыми конференциялар, дөңгелек үстелдер, халықаралық форумдар өткізіп келеді.

ҚСЗИ-дың ғылыми басқосуларына Қазақстанның ғана емес, сонымен қатар, Орталық Азия елдерінің, АҚШ-тың, Германияның, Жапонияның, Иранның, Қытайдың, Ресейдің, Түркияның, Францияның және басқа да мемлекеттердің ғалымдары белсене қатысуда.

ҚСЗИ алғаш рет «қауіпсіздік» және «сыртқы саясат» санаты бойынша әлемдік «ақыл-ой» орталықтарының рейтингіне енді

Қазақстан Республикасының Президенті жанындағы Қазақстанның стратегиялық зерттеулер институты (ҚСЗИ) Дүниежүзілік сараптамалық орталықтардың 2015 жылға арналған индекс-рейтингінде бірден төрт номинацияда орын алған.

Бұл рейтинг 1989 жылдан әлемдегі алты мыңға жуық «ақыл-ой орталықтарының» қызметін талдау негізінде сараптамалық құрылымдардың жетістіктері мен олардың даму үрдістерін анықтау бойынша Пенсильвания университетінің «Сараптамалық орталықтар мен азаматтық қоғам» зерттеу бағдарламасы аясында жасалады.

Рейтингтің қорытындысы бойынша (http://repository.upenn.edu/think_tanks/10/) ҚСЗИ қауіпсіздік, қорғаныс және сыртқы саясат саласындағы 100 ең үздік зерттеу орталықтарының қатарына қосылды. Сонымен қатар институт алғаш рет үздік мемлекеттік «ақыл-ой» орталықтарының тізіміне енді. ҚСЗИ бұл тізімде әлем бойынша 57-ші орынды иеленіп отыр.

Орталық Азиядағы үздік сараптамалық құрылымдардың арасында ҚСЗИ алғашқы үштікке еніп, өз орнын сақтап қалды, сондай-ақ энергетика және шикізат саясатын зерттеу саласында 33-ші орынға тұрақтады.

Бұл көрсеткіштер Қазақстандағы сараптамалық орталықтардың рөлі артып келе жатқанын көрсетеді. Отандық «ақыл-ой» орталықтарының жариялап отырған ғылыми-сарапшылық материалдарына шетелде жиі сілтеме жасалады.

ҚСЗИ туралы толық ақпаратты төмендегі мекенжайдан алуға болады:

Қазақстан Республикасы, 010000, Астана,
Бейбітшілік көшесі, 4
Тел.: +7 (7172) 75-20-20
Факс: +7 (7172) 75-20-21
E-mail: office@kisi.kz
www.kisi.kz

Информация о Казахском институте стратегических исследований при Президенте Республики Казахстан

Казахстанский институт стратегических исследований (КИСИ) при Президенте Республики Казахстан был создан Указом Президента Республики Казахстан 16 июня 1993 г. В апреле 2014 г. Указом Президента Республики Казахстан КИСИ был передислоцирован в г. Астану.

С момента своего возникновения основной задачей Казахского института стратегических исследований при Президенте Республики Казахстан как государственного научно-исследовательского учреждения является научно-аналитическое обеспечение деятельности Президента Казахстана, руководящих органов страны.

За это время КИСИ превратился в высокопрофессиональный научно-аналитический центр. В настоящее время в институте работают шесть докторов наук, десять кандидатов наук, Ph.D, специалисты в области политологии, истории, экономики, социологии.

За 23 года деятельности в институте было издано более 250 книг по международным отношениям, проблемам глобальной и региональной безопасности. В КИСИ издаются три журнала: «Қоғам және Дәуір» (на казахском языке), «Казахстан-Спектр» (на русском языке), «Central Asia's Affairs» (на английском языке). Институт располагает собственным сайтом на трех языках: казахском, русском и английском.

В КИСИ ежегодно проводится большое количество международных научных конференций, семинаров, круглых столов.

Особый интерес у экспертов вызывают ежегодные конференции КИСИ, проводимые с 2003 г. и посвященные проблемам безопасности и сотрудничества в Центральной Азии.

В научных форумах КИСИ принимают участие не только эксперты из Казахстана и стран Центральной Азии, но и ученые из Германии, Индии, Ирана, Китая, Пакистана, России, США, Турции, Франции, Японии и др.

КИСИ впервые вошел в рейтинг мировых «мозговых» центров по категориям «безопасность» и «внешняя политика»

Казахстанский институт стратегических исследований (КИСИ) при Президенте Республики Казахстан был отмечен сразу в четырех номинациях Всемирного индекс-рейтинга аналитических центров по итогам 2015 г.

Рейтинг составляется в рамках Исследовательской программы Университета Пенсильвании «Аналитические центры и гражданское общество» по признанию достижений аналитических структур и выявлению тенденций их развития по всему миру с 1989 г. на основе анализа деятельности более шести тысяч «мозговых центров» в мире.

По итогам нового рейтинга (http://repository.upenn.edu/think_tanks/10/) КИСИ вошел в топ-100 лучших исследовательских центров в сфере безопасности, обороны и внешней политики. Более того, институт впервые вошел в список лучших государственных «мозговых» центров, заняв 57-е место в мире.

В рейтинге лучших аналитических структур Центральной Азии КИСИ сохранил свое положение, войдя в тройку лидеров, а также занял 33-е место в области исследования энергетической и сырьевой политики.

Стоит отметить, что данные показатели говорят в целом о возрастающей роли аналитических центров в Казахстане. Научно-экспертные материалы казахстанских «мозговых» центров все чаще цитируются и за рубежом.

Более подробную информацию о КИСИ можно получить по адресу:

Республика Казахстан, 010000, Астана,
ул. Бейбитшилик, 4
Тел.: +7 (7172) 75-20-20
Факс: +7 (7172) 75-20-21
E-mail: office@kisi.kz
www.kisi.kz

10 MOST IMPORTANT EVENTS FOR CENTRAL ASIA IN 2017



Following the tradition of the analytical community, the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (KazISS) presents its annual overview of the 10 most important events for Central Asia in 2017 that will play key role in political and economic development and are important for stability and security in the region.

1

GRADUAL RECOVERY OF COMMODITY MARKETS: BETTER CONJUNCTURE FOR CENTRAL ASIAN ECONOMIES



In 2017, we can expect continued recovery of the world commodity markets that began in the second half of 2016. Oil prices in 2017 will exceed that of 2016 by about 20-25% and probably stabilize within 50-60 dollars during 2017. It means that the average annual price of 2017 will exceed the equivalent figure of 2016 approximately by 20-25%. It will allow resource-based economies, including Kazakhstan, to demonstrate apparent growth by about 2 - 2.5% compared to about 0.8% in 2016. Due to the oil factor, the Russian economy will grow more intensely and

consequently impact the countries of Central Asia. It is the result of intensification of the relations within the Eurasian Economic Union and also of further migrant workers attraction of to the growing Russian market.

However, commodity markets will be of limited growth and will remain at risk of new falls. The Fed's monetary policy will remain the main risk factor for global financial stability in 2017 and its restricting by increasing the rates that may negate the growing positive tendencies. The increase in rates will indicate deterioration of credit conditions, rising costs of all types of services, decrease in business and consumer activity as well as pressure in terms of all types of assets in the organized financial markets. All these may result in a new global financial crisis. Taking into account the whole range of external factors, one can predict the Central Asian countries to grow faster, but not as fast compared to the pre-crisis period.

2

SIGNIFICANT INTERNAL POLITICAL PROCESSES IN EXTERNAL STATES: RUSSIA, CHINA, USA, TURKEY AND IRAN



Not only local trends, but also internal political processes in foreign countries will play an important role for Central Asian countries in 2017. Russia will spend this year in preparations for the presidential elections. In the Fall 2017, China will hold the XIX Congress of the Communist Party - the most important political event for the country. Significant renewal of the membership is expected in the CPC Central Committee, the Politburo of the Central Committee and the Politburo Standing Committee.

In the United States, the new administration will form new teams in key government structures. The further global strategy development will depend on the results of this reset. On one hand, continuing instability in Afghanistan and growing role of Russia and China in Central Asia will maintain the interest of the White House in the region. On the other hand, the "Trump factor" will largely affect the decisions and behavior of the above regional powers in their relation to the Central Asian region.

The referendum in Turkey on the amendments to the constitution and transition to the presidential system and also presidential elections in Iran in May 2017 are also important events. To sum up, as the key regional and non-regional powers enter the new phase of their domestic political cycle, these changes may have direct or indirect impact on the strategy of their further relations with Central Asia.

3

NEW DEMOGRAPHIC THRESHOLD: THE POPULATION OF CENTRAL ASIA TO REACH 70 MILLION



2017 is the turning point for the demographic situation in Central Asia. In 1991 total population of the region was 51 million people. During last 25 years this number increased by 34.4%, and reached 68.6 million in 2016. Over the past 5 years, the average population growth rate increased from 1.2% to 1.7%. This positive dynamics will make it possible to cross the 70 million threshold in 2017, or at least to reach this critical number. The growth of population is confirmed by the decrease in mortality, increase in average life expectancy and birth rate in the region. The governments of Central Asian countries should take

into account the new economic opportunities and social risks related to the increasing population of the region.

4

UZBEKISTAN: NEW IMPULSES FOR CENTRAL ASIA



2017 will be the first and important for the new administration of Uzbekistan. The new government of Uzbekistan has declared 2017 "The year of dialogue with people and human interests". Announced key reforms connected to modernization of the public administration and the judicial system, liberalization of socio-economic areas will not only have the national importance but also can give a positive impetus to the entire region.

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Slight mitigation of the investment climate and new principles of currency regulation may serve as an apparent impetus for the development of Uzbekistan's economy while the new foreign policy highlights may intensify the relations between countries in the region, and their non-regional partners. The Development Strategy for 2017-2021 that will be the key document for the country is to be developed and adopted.

5

THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN TURKMENISTAN AND KYRGYZSTAN: THE START OF NEW ELECTORAL CYCLE



The presidential elections are to be held in Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan in 2017. The Turkmen government has made a number of significant changes in 2016. The presidential term in the office was extended from 5 to 7 years, and the age limit of 70 years for candidates was removed. Candidates from three registered political parties, including the current president, are expected to run in the elections on February 17, 2017.

While the results of the presidential elections in Turkmenistan are rather predictable, the outcome of the autumn elections 2017 in Kyrgyzstan is not. The current President of Kyrgyzstan Almazbek Atambayev said he would not run for another term, and also wouldn't propose a successor. There are well-known politicians and new people among candidates for the president of Kyrgyzstan so the competition is going to be intense.

Due to the amendments made to constitution during the national referendum that took place in December Kyrgyzstan will continue adopting parliamentary form of government in 2017. It means that the new president of Kyrgyzstan will have much less power than his predecessors. At the same time he will be assigned an important task - to rule the country that is on the verge of changes.

6

CONTINUING TERRORIST THREATS IN CENTRAL ASIA DUE TO ONGOING CONFLICTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST



The conflict in Syria and Iraq continue to pose a terrorist threat and to set international agenda in security area. In this context, internal prerequisites for radicalism and terrorist resurgences will remain in number of Central Asian countries. The threat of returning of Central Asian fighters will be increasing in the context of changing situation in the Middle East.

Further deterioration of relations between the key actors involved in conflict resolution in the Middle East, and worsening of the domestic political situation in Afghanistan will negatively impact the security situation of Central Asia.

7

THE AFGHAN FACTOR: CONTINUING INSTABILITY



In 2017, the internal political situation in Afghanistan is expected to remain tense. The main challenges will be largely determined by the military activity of Taliban movement in bordering provinces in the North, East and South of the country as well as the limited presence of ISIS and Al-Qaeda supporters. At the same time, uncertain state of the coalition government, delays in holding the next parliamentary and local elections coupled with the ongoing tensions within the elite will be a serious test for the current leadership of the country.

In conditions of the military and political instability Afghanistan will remain the focus of attention of key external players which will actualize the regional security agenda.

8

HALF OF POPULATION OF CENTRAL ASIA TO ACCESS INTERNET



In last several years the population proportion using Internet and social networks in Central Asia has increased. Since 2010, that number has doubled - from 14.5 to 29.9 million people. In 2017 the positive trend is expected to continue: the number of internet users will reach at least 30 million people or 45% of the regional population.

On one hand, Internet usage as an instrument of effective communications has certain opportunities. It can facilitate the access of citizens to public services, information and education. E-government portal launched in 2006 in Kazakhstan currently provides its services to about 5 million citizens of the country. In Uzbekistan, during 2 months of work the amount of online applications received through virtual reception offices reached 45% of the total number of applications. Kyrgyzstan's Development Strategy stipulates for the full implementation of e-government system to 2017. There have been positive dynamics in information and communication technologies development in Tajikistan, namely in visa issuing, customs and treasury systems. Turkmenistan is also witnessing increased Internet usage among its citizens annually.

However, these developments bring new challenges in social system; the new realities should be taken into account by the governments in Central Asia.

9

CONTINUING GROWTH OF CHINA'S INVESTMENTS IN CENTRAL ASIA



In 2017, China's economic presence in the region will continue to grow. China's position as one of the main trade partners of Central Asian countries remains intact and the beginning of implementing of major investment projects including those funded by the Silk Road Fund and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in the framework of the "Silk Road Economic Belt" will promote to that.

In 2017, Kazakhstan will start implementing consequent 12 investment projects of all quantity of the joint Kazakh-Chinese projects. Kyrgyzstan will continue to implement large-scale projects such as alternative "North-South" route and modernization of the Bishkek CHP plant. The construction of the fourth branch of "Central Asia - China" gas pipeline will also continue along the Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Tajikistan-Kyrgyzstan-China route.

10

KAZAKHSTAN IN THE CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION IN 2017: UNSC NON-PERMANENT MEMBERSHIP, UNIVERSIADE, EXPO, SCO SUMMIT AND 25TH CICA ANNIVERSARY



In 2017, Kazakhstan will be actively involved in regional and international events. Kazakhstan will be a two-year non-permanent member of the UN Security Council that will take the regional agenda to a global level. Moreover, Kazakhstan will host a number of events of international significance, namely the 2017 Universiade, 2017 EXPO, 2017 SCO Summit, and the events marking the 25th anniversary of the CICA initiative in October.

Astana reaffirms its reputation as one of the political world capitals becoming "Asian Geneva" by providing platforms for meetings and negotiations around issues of international security and cooperation. In general, this year will become an important stage in strengthening international identity not only of Kazakhstan but also the whole Central Asia.

Republic of Kazakhstan
Astana, 010000
4, Beybitshilik St.

Тел.: +7 (7172) 75-20-20
Fax: +7 (7172) 75-20-21
E-mail: office@kisi.kz
www.kisi.kz
www.kaziss.kz